I might be wrong, but my sense is that now in this soaring season, and
considering *only* quantity of gliders "substantially damaged" or worse, few
semi-regular, US-based, RAS readers would not agree this U.S. season is -
statistical pedantry aside - already distinctly worse-than-recent-years.

Non-midair ship-damage-inflicted hasn't apparently (if still-TBD in some
cases) been limited to uncurrent, inexperienced (total, or in-type) pilots,
or, been an exclusive function of 'bad luck' associated with off-field landings.

Some fundamental questions:
- why aren't we pilots as a group more considerate of our expensive equipment?
- why intentionally shave margins thin in the absence of a compelling reason
to do so...and awareness we ARE doing so?
- have any readers/contributors had (near) incidents in which neither
time-in-type (absence of) or currency (lack of) or 'obvious outside factors'
were factors, and if so, what *were* contributing factors?

Perhaps a wide-ranging, open, discussion of 'the whole safety thing' might be
worthwhile, both here and within our clubs. All pilots (presumably) believe
themselves sufficiently safe as to be unlikely to be PIC in anything other
than a 'pure bad luck' related accident/incident. There may be a few readers
who've even been involved in such.

But my personal 1st-hand experience, combined with a long-standing interest in
learning from the gaffes/unluckiness of other pilots, leads to the personal
conclusion the majority of crunches are NOT 'pure bad luck.' The good news
(considering only my personal experiences) is I've not been a repeat offender,
insofar as 'primary contributors' are concerned. Nonetheless, for me, pushing
weather limits has been one obvious potential "Gotcha!" (Duh!) Big surprise,
given the nature of sport soaring. That said, none of my 3 scratch-n-dent
inducing incidents had weather as a contributor...well, other than, in 2 of
the 3, by inducing soarability, I mean.

For better or worse, I early-on in my PIC-ing concluded I'd be much
happier/safer avoiding crunches, incidents, etc., than trying to explain or
justify how they happened, point being that I actively THOUGHT ABOUT the
possibility I COULD be involved in such. I think the belief not only helped
power/fine-tune my "situational awareness" radar, but favorably influenced all
my future piloting, gliderporting, driving, bicycling, urban pedestrianing,
etc. experiences. Personal safety culture, if you will. And no, I don't
consider my outlook an inoculation against personal lapses of
attention...though I do believe my outlook distinctly decreases the chances
I'll be involved in a self-inflicted incident or accident. (So far, so good!)

What do others think?

Bob W.

On a local level the miserable start to the year has certainly impacted our behaviors. I've been communicating to my club the recent incidents and the reminders to keep your head out of the cockpit and maximize situational awareness. This goes for on the ground as well and keeping an eye out for each other.

Another item to try to facilitate is open discussion of anything that seems unsafe. Anyone that has ever watched a low and slow approach and not said something to the pilot is not helping develop a safe culture. You don't have to beat a person up, but make sure they understand the risks they are taking.

A core group of XC pilots from our region have been working out improved standards for position reporting as well. We are trying to lead by example, but are also learning about what is most effective and important as we go. We fly along pretty well defined energy lines and this increases the head-to-head chances on a good convergence day.

Personally speaking, we have people at the grass roots level trying to make a difference. How fast and far that spreads remains to be seen.

The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to change. They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile poison the environment for everyone. Adoption of Flarm or Transponders or Radio usage or safety practices can all be very detrimentally affected by a loud naysayer, even when the arguments lack validity.

Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your own behaviors. Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.

> The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to change. *They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile poison the environment for everyone. *Adoption of Flarm or Transponders or Radio usage or safety practices can all be very detrimentally affected by a loud naysayer, even when the arguments lack validity.
>
> Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your own behaviors. *Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.


No kiddin'!

The safety of the sport of soaring for any particular pilot is only as
safe as he/she chooses to make his/her next flight.

On Monday, June 25, 2012 12:11:59 PM UTC-4, BobW wrote:
> ... I actively THOUGHT ABOUT the
> possibility I COULD be involved in such. I think the belief not only helped
> power/fine-tune my "situational awareness" radar, but favorably influenced all
> my future piloting, gliderporting, driving, bicycling, urban pedestrianing,
> etc. experiences. Personal safety culture, if you will.

Right. How many glider pilots slip and fall to their death while getting out of the bathtub? You only need one fatal event to die unnaturally. I'm like you. Doing a sport like flying that could so obviously kill me has increased my own sense of mortality and encouraged me to be more careful with the more manageable hazards ... for example, jaywalking. I'm in mortal peril for a few hours a week, but for the remaining hours of the week I'm less likely to die than I was before I took up soaring. So maybe flying has reduced my overall chances of premature termination??

That said, a minority of people are "safety minded". We'd like to think that all pilots are safety minded, but I'm pretty sure that the pilot population spans a broad spectrum of attitudes. I'd accept without evidence that all pilots educate themselves and make an effort to follow relatively safe procedures and fly safely, but I doubt that they all do it to the same objective standard. Some people take much bigger risks relative to skill. Do we accept that some pilots are dangerous to themselves and others? How does a dangerous pilot know that he is dangerous? How does he become less dangerous? Of course, I'm a dangerous pilot... the question for me is how,when, and what can I do about it.

Morgan,

What a Great Start to an important discussion! Thanks for contributing, and
Even More Thanks for your cogent, specific, examples of useful behavioral
change!!!

Hoping only to encourage others to contribute their thoughts - whether in
general agreement, skeptical or contrary - I've provided my personal feedback
below...
= = = = = =

On 6/25/2012 12:52 PM, Morgan wrote:
> On a local level the miserable start to the year has certainly impacted our
> behaviors. I've been communicating to my club the recent incidents and the
> reminders to keep your head out of the cockpit and maximize situational
> awareness. This goes for on the ground as well and keeping an eye out for
> each other.

Being 100% unfamiliar with you/your club, allow me to suggest to readers
(especially those newer to the sport) that what you're doing is a Great Way to
begin cultural change, if indeed anyone thinks cultural change might be a good
thing. Personal involvement.
- - - - - -
>
> Another item to try to facilitate is open discussion of anything that seems
> unsafe. Anyone that has ever watched a low and slow approach and not said
> something to the pilot is not helping develop a safe culture. You don't
> have to beat a person up, but make sure they understand the risks they are
> taking.

"Spot On," and, "Great Example!" Is there a club in the U.S. that on any given
weekend doesn't have at least one 'uninformedly dodgy low approach' for Joe
Observer to witness/learn something from/discuss? Two keys assisting healthy
discussion are (IMHO): 1) 'being sensitive' to the offending pilot's ego; and
2) the commitment to assume some personal responsibility for - step by tiny
step - improving one's club's pilots' "collective judgments."
- - - - - -

>
> A core group of XC pilots from our region have been working out improved
> standards for position reporting as well. We are trying to lead by
> example, but are also learning about what is most effective and important
> as we go. We fly along pretty well defined energy lines and this increases
> the head-to-head chances on a good convergence day.

"How cool is that?!?" I mean trying to improve something as arguably amorphous
as effective position reporting. Don't anyone imagine only mountainous areas
or areas with known convergence lines might benefit from 'improved position
reporting' as an idea. A long-standing XC camp in the Texas panhandle
encourages participants to do the same thing, especially when flying up-n-down
the primary road retrieval route.

I've long thought ANY position reporting boils down simply to, "Here I am (and
by implication, don't hit me)."

For example, "Zuni 3, 10.7, climbing 2 SW of Hooker," or "Z3 10.7, NE-bound, 5
NE of Hooker, south of the highway."

Functionally, that's "all" FLARM tries to accomplish, despite its 'processor
enhanced smarts.'

On voice frequencies, arguably anything not fundamentally a part of "Here I
am," ought not to be transmitted. Why not? It's superfluous, whether the
receiver is a retrieve crew tagging along, or Joe Pilot is so enthralled with
his situation he 'wants to share his joy.' Given the fact any voice frequency
is a limited resource, sharing 'on the ground, later' is 'better.'

Nor should the transmission be 'locationally ambiguous.' Leave out locational
information at the risk of initiating an (avoidable, with thought beforehand)
radio exchange from someone needful of what was left out. Practice will
rapidly improve one's transmissions...
- - - - - -
>
> Personally speaking, we have people at the grass roots level trying to make
> a difference. How fast and far that spreads remains to be seen.
>
"Cool!" to the first sentence, and "Roger that!" to the second. Effecting
human behavioral change isn't something easily/instantly accomplished. Time is
always an impartial judge, even if we'd sometimes rather it wasn't...
- - - - - -

> The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to change.
> They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile poison the
> environment for everyone. Adoption of Flarm or Transponders or Radio usage
> or safety practices can all be very detrimentally affected by a loud
> naysayer, even when the arguments lack validity.

Thanks for helping validate my own thinking. I've no problem 'agreeing to
disagree' but I DO find it problematic in soaring when people take actions
most objective observers would agree is detrimental to the sport as a whole.
Soaring is a sufficiently marginal activity (in societal terms) that every
participant should actively seek to avoid actions with potential for further
marginalization of it.
- - - - - -

>
> Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your own
> behaviors. Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.

Control what you can control. Seek to influence what you can't control.
Who'd'a ever thunk simple parenting skills might also carry over into soaring? :-)

Bob W.

I am in agreement with everything said so far. Thanks for starting this and other safety threads. For me, as a 100/hr glider pilot, these RAS safety discussions have really given me extra incentive to dig deeper and come up with creative solutions that work for me. (hopefully!) I have also become more involved in watching out for others in our club and speaking up when necessary.

The following is probably more specific than this threads direction, but I believe in sharing real world examples of safety ideas, so here are some thing I’ve been doing.

I make my own checklists for the seated portion of my flight, for each glider type I fly. I think there are idiosyncrasies about various gliders that one really needs to be reminded of via their custom checklist. These custom checklists start with and include all of the factory items in factory order, with usually a few additions.

During tow, I use my closed fist against the airbrake to guard it from popping open, I give the release a slap to put it in the front of my mind. I talk continually on tow till 400 feet. I announce where I will land, and current IAS. In the pattern for landing I continually announce IAS and coordination and clearing of turns.

Lastly, I took the following advice for currency/emergency practice from a power aircraft article I once read. I made a spreadsheet for keeping track of Condor simulator emergency practice. Condor doesn't have much emergency features built in, but some of the gliders spin and are difficult to get out of the spin with full water and aft CG setting. For aerotow emergency practice, I set a huge crosswind to the point where I will have to release on ground roll 1 out of 2 tries. With repetition, I get wired to release rather than expecting a successful tow. Also, I can become used to seeing the wave off (followed by release and downwind landing) by setting aerotow to 200agl. I use my paper checklist and announce just like real world. Other columns in the spreadsheet include incipient spin, established spin, landing with no airbrakes, high winds in the pattern, downwind landing, and rope break at various altitudes. What Condor simulator is very good at is repetition with maneuvers that are often too dangerous to practice in real world. Also good for coordination if you have rudder pedals as I do.

… Aaron

On Monday, June 25, 2012 12:06:23 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
> > The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to change. *They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile poison the environment for everyone. *Adoption of Flarm or Transponders or Radio usage or safety practices can all be very detrimentally affected by a loud naysayer, even when the arguments lack validity.
> >
> > Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your own behaviors. *Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.
>
>
> No kiddin'!
>
> The safety of the sport of soaring for any particular pilot is only as
> safe as he/she chooses to make his/her next flight.

Apparently it is not working this way. Otherwise accidents would have happened only to unsafe pilots, but the statistics is showing otherwise. Problem is that most pilots are not aware that they are doing something unsafe. Most pilots are not aware of the many different ways they can kill themselves, since we do not have an effective system to learn from accidents and incidents and figure out ways to prevent them from happening again, as oppose to commercial aviation which constantly learn from every accident as much as possible and implement lessons, resulting in contiguous improved safety. Our safet record not only not improving, but getting worse. Last year was a record year for fatalities, and this year we would have already broke this record if not for some amazing luck. And it is only the beginning of the season. Almost every fatality I heard of since I started flying many years ago had no useful information or conclusion other than speculation on RAS and the typical useless NTSB report. Those who knows the details, and those who survives the crashes, usually prefer to keep the details for themselves. Until we manage to implement such a system, pilots will continue killing themselves without realizing they are not as safe as they choose to be.

Ramy

On Jun 25, 6:38*pm, Ramy > wrote:
> On Monday, June 25, 2012 12:06:23 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
> > > The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to change. *They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile poison the environment for everyone. *Adoption of Flarm or Transponders or Radio usage or safety practices can all be very detrimentally affected by a loud naysayer, even when the arguments lack validity.
>
> > > Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your own behaviors. *Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.
>
> > No kiddin'!
>
> > The safety of the sport of soaring for any particular pilot is only as
> > safe as he/she chooses to make his/her next flight.
>
> Apparently it is not working this way. Otherwise accidents would have happened only to unsafe pilots, but the statistics is showing otherwise. Problem is that most pilots are not aware that they are doing something unsafe. Most pilots are not aware of the many different ways they can kill themselves, since we do not have an effective system to learn from accidents and incidents and figure out ways to prevent them from happening again, as oppose to commercial aviation which constantly learn from every accident as much as possible and implement lessons, resulting in contiguous improved safety. Our safet record not only not improving, but getting worse. Last year was a record year for fatalities, and this year we would have already broke this record if not for some amazing luck. And it is only the beginning of the season. *Almost every fatality I heard of since I started flying many years ago had no useful information or conclusion other than speculation on RAS and the typical useless NTSB report. Those who knows the details, and those who survives the crashes, usually prefer to keep the details for themselves. Until we manage to implement such a system, pilots will continue killing themselves without realizing they are not as safe as they choose to be.
>
> Ramy

It works like this.
Fact: There was a crash.
Uninformed speculation: The pilot was 'safe' so there must be an
outside cause.

I've discussed this with Greg Feith, a retired NTSB investigator
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greg_Feith). Feith says we're naturally
uncomfortable with pilot error since "they were one of us". NTSB
reports aren't useless just because they fail to list evidence the
pilot was at fault - the investigation stops when it's obvious the
cause was pilot error but the final report will stop short of calling
a recently departed pilot an idiot.

Never miss a chance to attend one of Feith's seminars. It's a
sobering, chilling experience but you will be a safer pilot because of
it. There are few accidents where the pilot was not at least a
contributing factor.

There are no secret new accident causes. It's an informative exercise
to download a couple of years of NTSB glider accident reports and
tabulate them in Excel - something I do every year. Almost every one
will be pilot error - usually gross error. Were these 'safe' pilots?
It would be a stretch to say they were. It only gets complicated if
you try to re-interpret the facts to show the pilot was somehow not
responsible. "Occam's razor" applies.

On Monday, June 25, 2012 8:38:39 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
> On Jun 25, 6:38*pm, Ramy > wrote:
> > On Monday, June 25, 2012 12:06:23 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
> > > > The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to change. *They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile poison the environment for everyone. *Adoption of Flarm or Transponders or Radio usage or safety practices can all be very detrimentally affected by a loud naysayer, even when the arguments lack validity.
> >
> > > > Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your own behaviors. *Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.
> >
> > > No kiddin'!
> >
> > > The safety of the sport of soaring for any particular pilot is only as
> > > safe as he/she chooses to make his/her next flight.
> >
> > Apparently it is not working this way. Otherwise accidents would have happened only to unsafe pilots, but the statistics is showing otherwise. Problem is that most pilots are not aware that they are doing something unsafe.. Most pilots are not aware of the many different ways they can kill themselves, since we do not have an effective system to learn from accidents and incidents and figure out ways to prevent them from happening again, as oppose to commercial aviation which constantly learn from every accident as much as possible and implement lessons, resulting in contiguous improved safety. Our safet record not only not improving, but getting worse. Last year was a record year for fatalities, and this year we would have already broke this record if not for some amazing luck. And it is only the beginning of the season. *Almost every fatality I heard of since I started flying many years ago had no useful information or conclusion other than speculation on RAS and the typical useless NTSB report. Those who knows the details, and those who survives the crashes, usually prefer to keep the details for themselves. Until we manage to implement such a system, pilots will continue killing themselves without realizing they are not as safe as they choose to be..
> >
> > Ramy
>
> It works like this.
> Fact: There was a crash.
> Uninformed speculation: The pilot was 'safe' so there must be an
> outside cause.
>
> I've discussed this with Greg Feith, a retired NTSB investigator
> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greg_Feith). Feith says we're naturally
> uncomfortable with pilot error since "they were one of us". NTSB
> reports aren't useless just because they fail to list evidence the
> pilot was at fault - the investigation stops when it's obvious the
> cause was pilot error but the final report will stop short of calling
> a recently departed pilot an idiot.
>
> Never miss a chance to attend one of Feith's seminars. It's a
> sobering, chilling experience but you will be a safer pilot because of
> it. There are few accidents where the pilot was not at least a
> contributing factor.
>
> There are no secret new accident causes. It's an informative exercise
> to download a couple of years of NTSB glider accident reports and
> tabulate them in Excel - something I do every year. Almost every one
> will be pilot error - usually gross error. Were these 'safe' pilots?
> It would be a stretch to say they were. It only gets complicated if
> you try to re-interpret the facts to show the pilot was somehow not
> responsible. "Occam's razor" applies.

I guess it all depends what falls under 'pilot error'. I agree that just about every accident you can blame the pilot, even if his rudder cable broke for example, after all, he didnt check his rudder cable before the flight. But how many of us are perfect? Same goes to a recent fatal accident where the pilot tried to bail out too low, probably due to some sort of mechanical failure. And a recent mid air, where none of the pilots saw each other until impact. The NTSB will,of course, determine it was pilots failure to see each other. Case closed . But is it? It's been demonstrated over and over that our eyes are not able to detect collision threat on time. So I wouldn't consider those as true pilot errors, but as bad luck or outside cause, which happened to safe pilots. And yes, we do find new ways to kill ourselves.. The recent Texas tragedy may reveal one. I know of other pilots who took a toddler for a flight. I am sure those who heard about this accident will think twice and hard before doing it again, and maybe, just maybe, another life will be saved thanks to sharing and speculating about the cause of this accident.

Ramy

I couple of years ago I have written an article about safety in
soaring (www.tango-whisky.com/safety.html) which has spread a little
bit throughout Europe.
Somebody said that every pilot has to decide for himself how safe he
is or wants to be, and I think this is absolutely correct. The key for
this decision is situational awareness - if you don't have it and you
don't exercise it every single minute of a flight, you are an accident
waiting to happen.

On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 1:21:13 AM UTC-5, Ramy wrote:

So I wouldn't consider those as true pilot errors, but as bad luck or outside cause, which happened to safe pilots.

Ramy, I have to disagree a bit. We have remarkably few accidents that are due to mechanical failure out of the control of the pilot - the recent JS-1 rudder cable is apparently one of those. But just about every other glider accident we have seems to be the direct or indirect result of pilot error..

Direct in that the pilot intentionally does something stupid and breaks something.

Indirect in that the pilot does something he doesn't know is stupid (due to poor training or lack of self-education) and breaks something.

Midairs? Sure, it's hard to see another plane - but if we run into each other in a thermal - both pilots looking at the cu instead of clearing where they are going - is that bad luck, lazy lookout, or poor training?

I think of myself as a safe, pilot (opinion not shared with some others, I fear). And I've done some really stupid things in gliders (only dinged one once, slightly). EVERY time I debriefed myself afterwards (as in, "YOU IDIOT, WTF WERE YOU THINKING!") it was pretty easy to see how I worked myself into the position to make a bad decision. That old chain of events is often glaringly obvious after the fact!

My contribution to this safety thing? It's always pilot error. If the pilot hadn't flown the plane, there wouldn't have been an accident. So the pilot has to prepare himself to avoid situations that are dangerous, or if necessary, have the skill to get out of a dangerous situation. Expecting someone else to make you safe is NOT going to work.

Kirk
66

On Jun 26, 12:21*am, Ramy > wrote:
> On Monday, June 25, 2012 8:38:39 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
> > On Jun 25, 6:38*pm, Ramy > wrote:
> > > On Monday, June 25, 2012 12:06:23 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
> > > > > The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to change. *They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile poison the environment for everyone. *Adoption of Flarm or Transponders or Radio usage or safety practices can all be very detrimentally affected by a loud naysayer, even when the arguments lack validity.
>
> > > > > Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your own behaviors. *Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.
>
> > > > No kiddin'!
>
> > > > The safety of the sport of soaring for any particular pilot is only as
> > > > safe as he/she chooses to make his/her next flight.
>
> > > Apparently it is not working this way. Otherwise accidents would have happened only to unsafe pilots, but the statistics is showing otherwise. Problem is that most pilots are not aware that they are doing something unsafe. Most pilots are not aware of the many different ways they can kill themselves, since we do not have an effective system to learn from accidents and incidents and figure out ways to prevent them from happening again, as oppose to commercial aviation which constantly learn from every accident as much as possible and implement lessons, resulting in contiguous improved safety. Our safet record not only not improving, but getting worse. Last year was a record year for fatalities, and this year we would have already broke this record if not for some amazing luck. And it is only the beginning of the season. *Almost every fatality I heard of since I started flying many years ago had no useful information or conclusion other than speculation on RAS and the typical useless NTSB report. Those who knows the details, and those who survives the crashes, usually prefer to keep the details for themselves. Until we manage to implement such a system, pilots will continue killing themselves without realizing they are not as safe as they choose to be.
>
> > > Ramy
>
> > It works like this.
> > Fact: There was a crash.
> > Uninformed speculation: The pilot was 'safe' so there must be an
> > outside cause.
>
> > I've discussed this with Greg Feith, a retired NTSB investigator
> > (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greg_Feith). *Feith says we're naturally
> > uncomfortable with pilot error since "they were one of us". *NTSB
> > reports aren't useless just because they fail to list evidence the
> > pilot was at fault - the investigation stops when it's obvious the
> > cause was pilot error but the final report will stop short of calling
> > a recently departed pilot an idiot.
>
> > Never miss a chance to attend one of Feith's seminars. *It's a
> > sobering, chilling experience but you will be a safer pilot because of
> > it. *There are few accidents where the pilot was not at least a
> > contributing factor.
>
> > There are no secret new accident causes. *It's an informative exercise
> > to download a couple of years of NTSB glider accident reports and
> > tabulate them in Excel - something I do every year. *Almost every one
> > will be pilot error - usually gross error. *Were these 'safe' pilots?
> > It would be a stretch to say they were. *It only gets complicated if
> > you try to re-interpret the facts to show the pilot was somehow not
> > responsible. *"Occam's razor" applies.
>
> I guess it all depends what falls under 'pilot error'. I agree that just about every accident you can blame the pilot, even if his rudder cable broke for example, after all, he didnt check his rudder cable before the flight.. But how many of us are perfect? Same goes to a recent fatal accident where the pilot tried to bail out too low, probably due to some sort of mechanical failure. And a recent mid air, where none of the pilots saw each other until impact. The NTSB will,of course, determine it was pilots failure to see each other. Case closed . But is it? It's been demonstrated over and over that our eyes are not able to detect collision threat on time. So I wouldn't consider those as true pilot errors, but as bad luck or outside cause, which happened to safe pilots. And yes, we do find new ways to kill ourselves. The recent Texas tragedy may reveal one. I know of other pilots who took a toddler for a flight. I am sure those who heard about this accident will think twice and hard before doing it again, and maybe, just maybe, another life will be saved thanks to sharing and speculating about the cause of this accident.
>
> Ramy

The Texas tragedy has happened many times before - it's called
improper loading. The manual clearly states it's a two-seat aircraft
but it improper loading doesn't have to be people. There was a
chillingly similar crash at about the same time in Colorado involving
a home-built airplane.

Midair's? I've had one and it was damn well pilot error - we were
both responsible but fortunately survived. I hope someday to see
PowerFlarm in every glider.

Of course nobody's perfect but when we step up to commit flight, we
take responsibility for our actions. If we didn't check that rudder
cable (and everything else) we've chosen to accept the risk there's an
unseen problem. Not being perfect doesn't allow us to shift the
responsibility elsewhere.

Like I said before, read the NTSB reports - not just a few but a lot
of them. Patterns will emerge and the mysteries will be resolved. I
remain convinced that after 109 years of flight, there are really few
to no new ways to crash. The tragedy is we keep repeating the same
mistakes.

Apologies for not trimming; just thought maintaining continuity of idea-flow
made sense here...

Bob W.
- - - - - -

On 6/26/2012 12:21 AM, Ramy wrote:
> On Monday, June 25, 2012 8:38:39 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
>> On Jun 25, 6:38 pm, Ramy > wrote:
>>> On Monday, June 25, 2012 12:06:23 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
>>>>> The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to
>>>>> change. They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile
>>>>> poison the environment for everyone. Adoption of Flarm or
>>>>> Transponders or Radio usage or safety practices can all be very
>>>>> detrimentally affected by a loud naysayer, even when the arguments
>>>>> lack validity.
>>>
>>>>> Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your
>>>>> own behaviors. Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.
>>>
>>>> No kiddin'!
>>>
>>>> The safety of the sport of soaring for any particular pilot is only
>>>> as safe as he/she chooses to make his/her next flight.
>>>
>>> Apparently it is not working this way. Otherwise accidents would have
>>> happened only to unsafe pilots, but the statistics is showing
>>> otherwise. Problem is that most pilots are not aware that they are
>>> doing something unsafe. Most pilots are not aware of the many different
>>> ways they can kill themselves, since we do not have an effective system
>>> to learn from accidents and incidents and figure out ways to prevent
>>> them from happening again, as oppose to commercial aviation which
>>> constantly learn from every accident as much as possible and implement
>>> lessons, resulting in contiguous improved safety. Our safet record not
>>> only not improving, but getting worse. Last year was a record year for
>>> fatalities, and this year we would have already broke this record if
>>> not for some amazing luck. And it is only the beginning of the season.
>>> Almost every fatality I heard of since I started flying many years ago
>>> had no useful information or conclusion other than speculation on RAS
>>> and the typical useless NTSB report. Those who knows the details, and
>>> those who survives the crashes, usually prefer to keep the details for
>>> themselves. Until we manage to implement such a system, pilots will
>>> continue killing themselves without realizing they are not as safe as
>>> they choose to be.
>>>
>>> Ramy
>>
>> It works like this. Fact: There was a crash. Uninformed speculation: The
>> pilot was 'safe' so there must be an outside cause.
>>
>> I've discussed this with Greg Feith, a retired NTSB investigator
>> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greg_Feith). Feith says we're naturally
>> uncomfortable with pilot error since "they were one of us". NTSB reports
>> aren't useless just because they fail to list evidence the pilot was at
>> fault - the investigation stops when it's obvious the cause was pilot
>> error but the final report will stop short of calling a recently departed
>> pilot an idiot.
>>
>> Never miss a chance to attend one of Feith's seminars. It's a sobering,
>> chilling experience but you will be a safer pilot because of it. There
>> are few accidents where the pilot was not at least a contributing
>> factor.

I married later in life to a glider PIC-in-training, so there was considerable
disparity in experience levels. I'd known OF Greg Feith from years of
head-shot TV exposures related to local crashes, and saw him once in person at
an in-flight-breakup/winch crash investigation. When I married, I knew he'd
retired from the NTSB, never encountered a reason to mention him to my wife,
and was surprised one day to hear HER mention his name.

She'd attended one of his seminars, for a work-related reason. It'd made a
sufficient impression on her to warrant discussion. I got the same impression
Bill D.'s "...sobering, chilling experience..." just made on me. From her
description, I wished I'd been there too.

>>
>> There are no secret new accident causes. It's an informative exercise to
>> download a couple of years of NTSB glider accident reports and tabulate
>> them in Excel - something I do every year. Almost every one will be
>> pilot error - usually gross error. Were these 'safe' pilots? It would be
>> a stretch to say they were. It only gets complicated if you try to
>> re-interpret the facts to show the pilot was somehow not responsible.
>> "Occam's razor" applies.
>
> I guess it all depends what falls under 'pilot error'. I agree that just
> about every accident you can blame the pilot, even if his rudder cable
> broke for example, after all, he didnt check his rudder cable before the
> flight. But how many of us are perfect? Same goes to a recent fatal
> accident where the pilot tried to bail out too low, probably due to some
> sort of mechanical failure. And a recent mid air, where none of the pilots
> saw each other until impact. The NTSB will,of course, determine it was
> pilots failure to see each other. Case closed . But is it? It's been
> demonstrated over and over that our eyes are not able to detect collision
> threat on time. So I wouldn't consider those as true pilot errors, but as
> bad luck or outside cause, which happened to safe pilots. And yes, we do
> find new ways to kill ourselves. The recent Texas tragedy may reveal one. I
> know of other pilots who took a toddler for a flight. I am sure those who
> heard about this accident will think twice and hard before doing it again,
> and maybe, just maybe, another life will be saved thanks to sharing and
> speculating about the cause of this accident.
>
> Ramy
>

Musing philosophically...

I've no problem - from a PIC's perspective - acknowledging "Fate" accidents
occur. A not terribly uncommon intermountain west example would be wings
coming off firebombers. For all practical purposes, no PIC could be expected
to detect such metal fatigue on a daily pre-flight inspection.

Without meaning to imply "Fate" never has a hand in glider accidents, none
come immediately to mind, though the wing failure that continues reverberating
in the Blanik L-13 world might qualify.

So put me in the category which chooses to believe Joe PIC is a crucial link
in the 'chain of failure' typically associated with aircraft (and glider of
course) accidents. I choose to believe this way NOT by way of inflating
feelings of personal superiority simply because I'm still alive and someone
else is not, but because: a) I believe it (duh), and b) I believe believing so
has very real enhancing effect on my own longevity (so call me selfish).

That said, I also readily admit many, if not most, of the fatal glider
accidents I choose to place in the category 'pilot error' (e.g. spins into the
ground, departures from controlled flight in the landing pattern, OFLs gone
bad) can't be "causally guaranteed" with 100% certainty as such, and often
aren't lacking in 'outside influences' I'd ask anyone who challenges based on
that uncertainty, "So what? The uncertainty is a double-edged sword: neither
of us can know for sure why this or that Joe PIC died." My next question is,
"Is it potentially more safe for YOU or ME - all still-living-pilots - to
assume Joe PIC screwed up fatally, or to assume 'something undefinable' beyond
his control trumped?"

In a perfect world, glider pilots would have access to all the investigative,
informational, disseminational, training and refresher resources presently
taken for granted in the commercial aviation world. In reality, it's up to Joe
Individual Pilot, assisted by all the instructional resources we DO have (FAA
mandated, instructors, peers, books, personal curiosity, software, etc.) to
self-educate. We do the best we can, try to influence others as to the wisdom
of our ways, seek to convey 'why' we think our way is wise, and hopefully
enjoy long and gratifying soaring 'careers.'

I still grieve for some friends and friendly acquaintances who 'somehow
screwed up' piloting gliders, but any human frailties that may have
contributed to their deaths don't diminish who they were in my mind. Call it
putting a human face on otherwise impersonal NTSB accident reports, call it
pure rationalization, call it what you will, I try to use their perceived
gaffes to help improve my chances.

So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without
a single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!
Head in the sand attitudes will not fix this problem.
WE NEED to air the dirty laundry until this problem is much better. We
can't depend on speculation on RAS or
digging for NTSB reports which often don't contain anything helpful.
Give me the facts, ma'am.

On Jun 26, 9:46*am, BobW > wrote:
> Apologies for not trimming; just thought maintaining continuity of idea-flow
> made sense here...
>
> Bob W.
> - - - - - -
>
> On 6/26/2012 12:21 AM, Ramy wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Monday, June 25, 2012 8:38:39 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
> >> On Jun 25, 6:38 pm, Ramy > wrote:
> >>> On Monday, June 25, 2012 12:06:23 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
> >>>>> The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to
> >>>>> change. *They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile
> >>>>> poison the environment for everyone. *Adoption of Flarm or
> >>>>> Transponders or Radio usage or safety practices can all be very
> >>>>> detrimentally affected by a loud naysayer, even when the arguments
> >>>>> lack validity.
>
> >>>>> Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your
> >>>>> own behaviors. *Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.
>
> >>>> No kiddin'!
>
> >>>> The safety of the sport of soaring for any particular pilot is only
> >>>> as safe as he/she chooses to make his/her next flight.
>
> >>> Apparently it is not working this way. Otherwise accidents would have
> >>> happened only to unsafe pilots, but the statistics is showing
> >>> otherwise. Problem is that most pilots are not aware that they are
> >>> doing something unsafe. Most pilots are not aware of the many different
> >>> ways they can kill themselves, since we do not have an effective system
> >>> to learn from accidents and incidents and figure out ways to prevent
> >>> them from happening again, as oppose to commercial aviation which
> >>> constantly learn from every accident as much as possible and implement
> >>> lessons, resulting in contiguous improved safety. Our safet record not
> >>> only not improving, but getting worse. Last year was a record year for
> >>> fatalities, and this year we would have already broke this record if
> >>> not for some amazing luck. And it is only the beginning of the season..
> >>> Almost every fatality I heard of since I started flying many years ago
> >>> had no useful information or conclusion other than speculation on RAS
> >>> and the typical useless NTSB report. Those who knows the details, and
> >>> those who survives the crashes, usually prefer to keep the details for
> >>> themselves. Until we manage to implement such a system, pilots will
> >>> continue killing themselves without realizing they are not as safe as
> >>> they choose to be.
>
> >>> Ramy
>
> >> It works like this. Fact: There was a crash. Uninformed speculation: The
> >> pilot was 'safe' so there must be an outside cause.
>
> >> I've discussed this with Greg Feith, a retired NTSB investigator
> >> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greg_Feith). *Feith says we're naturally
> >> uncomfortable with pilot error since "they were one of us". *NTSB reports
> >> aren't useless just because they fail to list evidence the pilot was at
> >> fault - the investigation stops when it's obvious the cause was pilot
> >> error but the final report will stop short of calling a recently departed
> >> pilot an idiot.
>
> >> Never miss a chance to attend one of Feith's seminars. *It's a sobering,
> >> chilling experience but you will be a safer pilot because of it. *There
> >> are few accidents where the pilot was not at least a contributing
> >> factor.
>
> I married later in life to a glider PIC-in-training, so there was considerable
> disparity in experience levels. I'd known OF Greg Feith from years of
> head-shot TV exposures related to local crashes, and saw him once in person at
> an in-flight-breakup/winch crash investigation. When I married, I knew he'd
> retired from the NTSB, never encountered a reason to mention him to my wife,
> and was surprised one day to hear HER mention his name.
>
> She'd attended one of his seminars, for a work-related reason. It'd made a
> sufficient impression on her to warrant discussion. I got the same impression
> Bill D.'s "...sobering, chilling experience..." just made on me. From her
> description, I wished I'd been there too.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >> There are no secret new accident causes. *It's an informative exercise to
> >> download a couple of years of NTSB glider accident reports and tabulate
> >> them in Excel - something I do every year. *Almost every one will be
> >> pilot error - usually gross error. *Were these 'safe' pilots? It would be
> >> a stretch to say they were. *It only gets complicated if you try to
> >> re-interpret the facts to show the pilot was somehow not responsible.
> >> "Occam's razor" applies.
>
> > I guess it all depends what falls under 'pilot error'. I agree that just
> > about every accident you can blame the pilot, even if his rudder cable
> > broke for example, after all, he didnt check his rudder cable before the
> > flight. But how many of us are perfect? Same goes to a recent fatal
> > accident where the pilot tried to bail out too low, probably due to some
> > sort of mechanical failure. And a recent mid air, where none of the pilots
> > saw each other until impact. The NTSB will,of course, determine it was
> > pilots failure to see each other. Case closed . But is it? It's been
> > demonstrated over and over that our eyes are not able to detect collision
> > threat on time. So I wouldn't consider those as true pilot errors, but as
> > bad luck or outside cause, which happened to safe pilots. And yes, we do
> > find new ways to kill ourselves. The recent Texas tragedy may reveal one. I
> > know of other pilots who took a toddler for a flight. I am sure those who
> > heard about this accident will think twice and hard before doing it again,
> > and maybe, just maybe, another life will be saved thanks to sharing and
> > speculating about the cause of this accident.
>
> > Ramy
>
> Musing philosophically...
>
> I've no problem - from a PIC's perspective - acknowledging "Fate" accidents
> occur. A not terribly uncommon intermountain west example would be wings
> coming off firebombers. For all practical purposes, no PIC could be expected
> to detect such metal fatigue on a daily pre-flight inspection.
>
> Without meaning to imply "Fate" never has a hand in glider accidents, none
> come immediately to mind, though the wing failure that continues reverberating
> in the Blanik L-13 world might qualify.
>
> So put me in the category which chooses to believe Joe PIC is a crucial link
> in the 'chain of failure' typically associated with aircraft (and glider of
> course) accidents. I choose to believe this way NOT by way of inflating
> feelings of personal superiority simply because I'm still alive and someone
> else is not, but because: a) I believe it (duh), and b) I believe believing so
> has very real enhancing effect on my own longevity (so call me selfish).
>
> That said, I also readily admit many, if not most, of the fatal glider
> accidents I choose to place in the category 'pilot error' (e.g. spins into the
> ground, departures from controlled flight in the landing pattern, OFLs gone
> bad) can't be "causally guaranteed" with 100% certainty as such, and often
> aren't lacking in 'outside influences' I'd ask anyone who challenges based on
> that uncertainty, "So what? The uncertainty is a double-edged sword: neither
> of us can know for sure why this or that Joe PIC died." My next question is,
> "Is it potentially more safe for YOU or ME - all still-living-pilots - to
> assume Joe PIC screwed up fatally, or to assume 'something undefinable' beyond
> his control trumped?"
>
> In a perfect world, glider pilots would have access to all the investigative,
> informational, disseminational, training and refresher resources presently
> taken for granted in the commercial aviation world. In reality, it's up to Joe
> Individual Pilot, assisted by all the instructional resources we DO have (FAA
> mandated, instructors, peers, books, personal curiosity, software, etc.) to
> self-educate. We do the best we can, try to influence others as to the wisdom
> of our ways, seek to convey 'why' we think our way is wise, and hopefully
> enjoy long and gratifying soaring 'careers.'
>
> I still grieve for some friends and friendly acquaintances who 'somehow
> screwed up' piloting gliders, but any human frailties that may have
> contributed to their deaths don't diminish who they were in my mind. Call it
> putting a human face on otherwise impersonal NTSB accident reports, call it
> pure rationalization, call it what you will, I try to use their perceived
> gaffes to help improve my chances.

The water bomber pilot certainly knew flying a half century year old
overloaded derelict in severe fire turbulence was "pushing it". That
he chose to do so is part heroics and part something else. Since I'm
sitting in Colorado smelling wildfire smoke I have a particular
appreciation for fire fighting pilots and what they do.

The pilot is responsible because he is the last person in a position
to prevent an accident. Certainly a mechanic SHOULD have checked for
metal fatigue but the pilot is responsible for knowing it actually
happened. If he doesn't know and doesn't check for whatever reason,
he's gambling with his life and his crew's.

A lot of 'outside influences' can add up to an accident but the pilot
is charged with knowing all of them and factoring them into the risk
equation. It's actually in the FAR's (Part 91.103 & 91.9 are two)
They require a pilot to consider anything which could adversely effect
the outcome of a flight.

On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 12:54:09 PM UTC-4, soartech wrote:
> So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without
> a single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!
> Head in the sand attitudes will not fix this problem.
> WE NEED to air the dirty laundry until this problem is much better. We
> can't depend on speculation on RAS or
> digging for NTSB reports which often don't contain anything helpful.
> Give me the facts, ma'am.

WTF. How is airing dirty laundry going to improve safety? I'm not saying bury it, but airing it won't change anything.

On Jun 26, 10:54*am, soartech > wrote:
> So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without
> a single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!
> Head in the sand attitudes will not fix this problem.
> WE NEED to air the dirty laundry until this problem is much better. We
> can't depend on speculation on RAS or
> digging for NTSB reports which often don't contain anything helpful.
> Give me the facts, ma'am.

Soaring Magazine isn't the place for this subject but the SSF web site
is. I'd like to see detailed no-holds-barred discussion of every
accident. Unfortunately, making public allegations of incompetence
against a deceased pilot CAN get you sued by irate family members.
There is a need to tread responsibly - and carefully.

On Jun 26, 9:46*am, BobW > wrote:
> Apologies for not trimming; just thought maintaining continuity of idea-flow
> made sense here...
>
> Bob W.
> - - - - - -
>
> On 6/26/2012 12:21 AM, Ramy wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Monday, June 25, 2012 8:38:39 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
> >> On Jun 25, 6:38 pm, Ramy > wrote:
> >>> On Monday, June 25, 2012 12:06:23 PM UTC-7, Bill D wrote:
> >>>>> The most poisonous attitude that I fear are the people resistant to
> >>>>> change. *They can resist for the sake of resistance and meanwhile
> >>>>> poison the environment for everyone. *Adoption of Flarm or
> >>>>> Transponders or Radio usage or safety practices can all be very
> >>>>> detrimentally affected by a loud naysayer, even when the arguments
> >>>>> lack validity.
>
> >>>>> Everyone just needs to keep trying and start with focusing on your
> >>>>> own behaviors. *Your personal safety culture as you pointed out.
>
> >>>> No kiddin'!
>
> >>>> The safety of the sport of soaring for any particular pilot is only
> >>>> as safe as he/she chooses to make his/her next flight.
>
> >>> Apparently it is not working this way. Otherwise accidents would have
> >>> happened only to unsafe pilots, but the statistics is showing
> >>> otherwise. Problem is that most pilots are not aware that they are
> >>> doing something unsafe. Most pilots are not aware of the many different
> >>> ways they can kill themselves, since we do not have an effective system
> >>> to learn from accidents and incidents and figure out ways to prevent
> >>> them from happening again, as oppose to commercial aviation which
> >>> constantly learn from every accident as much as possible and implement
> >>> lessons, resulting in contiguous improved safety. Our safet record not
> >>> only not improving, but getting worse. Last year was a record year for
> >>> fatalities, and this year we would have already broke this record if
> >>> not for some amazing luck. And it is only the beginning of the season..
> >>> Almost every fatality I heard of since I started flying many years ago
> >>> had no useful information or conclusion other than speculation on RAS
> >>> and the typical useless NTSB report. Those who knows the details, and
> >>> those who survives the crashes, usually prefer to keep the details for
> >>> themselves. Until we manage to implement such a system, pilots will
> >>> continue killing themselves without realizing they are not as safe as
> >>> they choose to be.
>
> >>> Ramy
>
> >> It works like this. Fact: There was a crash. Uninformed speculation: The
> >> pilot was 'safe' so there must be an outside cause.
>
> >> I've discussed this with Greg Feith, a retired NTSB investigator
> >> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greg_Feith). *Feith says we're naturally
> >> uncomfortable with pilot error since "they were one of us". *NTSB reports
> >> aren't useless just because they fail to list evidence the pilot was at
> >> fault - the investigation stops when it's obvious the cause was pilot
> >> error but the final report will stop short of calling a recently departed
> >> pilot an idiot.
>
> >> Never miss a chance to attend one of Feith's seminars. *It's a sobering,
> >> chilling experience but you will be a safer pilot because of it. *There
> >> are few accidents where the pilot was not at least a contributing
> >> factor.
>
> I married later in life to a glider PIC-in-training, so there was considerable
> disparity in experience levels. I'd known OF Greg Feith from years of
> head-shot TV exposures related to local crashes, and saw him once in person at
> an in-flight-breakup/winch crash investigation. When I married, I knew he'd
> retired from the NTSB, never encountered a reason to mention him to my wife,
> and was surprised one day to hear HER mention his name.
>
> She'd attended one of his seminars, for a work-related reason. It'd made a
> sufficient impression on her to warrant discussion. I got the same impression
> Bill D.'s "...sobering, chilling experience..." just made on me. From her
> description, I wished I'd been there too.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >> There are no secret new accident causes. *It's an informative exercise to
> >> download a couple of years of NTSB glider accident reports and tabulate
> >> them in Excel - something I do every year. *Almost every one will be
> >> pilot error - usually gross error. *Were these 'safe' pilots? It would be
> >> a stretch to say they were. *It only gets complicated if you try to
> >> re-interpret the facts to show the pilot was somehow not responsible.
> >> "Occam's razor" applies.
>
> > I guess it all depends what falls under 'pilot error'. I agree that just
> > about every accident you can blame the pilot, even if his rudder cable
> > broke for example, after all, he didnt check his rudder cable before the
> > flight. But how many of us are perfect? Same goes to a recent fatal
> > accident where the pilot tried to bail out too low, probably due to some
> > sort of mechanical failure. And a recent mid air, where none of the pilots
> > saw each other until impact. The NTSB will,of course, determine it was
> > pilots failure to see each other. Case closed . But is it? It's been
> > demonstrated over and over that our eyes are not able to detect collision
> > threat on time. So I wouldn't consider those as true pilot errors, but as
> > bad luck or outside cause, which happened to safe pilots. And yes, we do
> > find new ways to kill ourselves. The recent Texas tragedy may reveal one. I
> > know of other pilots who took a toddler for a flight. I am sure those who
> > heard about this accident will think twice and hard before doing it again,
> > and maybe, just maybe, another life will be saved thanks to sharing and
> > speculating about the cause of this accident.
>
> > Ramy
>
> Musing philosophically...
>
> I've no problem - from a PIC's perspective - acknowledging "Fate" accidents
> occur. A not terribly uncommon intermountain west example would be wings
> coming off firebombers. For all practical purposes, no PIC could be expected
> to detect such metal fatigue on a daily pre-flight inspection.
>
> Without meaning to imply "Fate" never has a hand in glider accidents, none
> come immediately to mind, though the wing failure that continues reverberating
> in the Blanik L-13 world might qualify.
>
> So put me in the category which chooses to believe Joe PIC is a crucial link
> in the 'chain of failure' typically associated with aircraft (and glider of
> course) accidents. I choose to believe this way NOT by way of inflating
> feelings of personal superiority simply because I'm still alive and someone
> else is not, but because: a) I believe it (duh), and b) I believe believing so
> has very real enhancing effect on my own longevity (so call me selfish).
>
> That said, I also readily admit many, if not most, of the fatal glider
> accidents I choose to place in the category 'pilot error' (e.g. spins into the
> ground, departures from controlled flight in the landing pattern, OFLs gone
> bad) can't be "causally guaranteed" with 100% certainty as such, and often
> aren't lacking in 'outside influences' I'd ask anyone who challenges based on
> that uncertainty, "So what? The uncertainty is a double-edged sword: neither
> of us can know for sure why this or that Joe PIC died." My next question is,
> "Is it potentially more safe for YOU or ME - all still-living-pilots - to
> assume Joe PIC screwed up fatally, or to assume 'something undefinable' beyond
> his control trumped?"
>
> In a perfect world, glider pilots would have access to all the investigative,
> informational, disseminational, training and refresher resources presently
> taken for granted in the commercial aviation world. In reality, it's up to Joe
> Individual Pilot, assisted by all the instructional resources we DO have (FAA
> mandated, instructors, peers, books, personal curiosity, software, etc.) to
> self-educate. We do the best we can, try to influence others as to the wisdom
> of our ways, seek to convey 'why' we think our way is wise, and hopefully
> enjoy long and gratifying soaring 'careers.'
>
> I still grieve for some friends and friendly acquaintances who 'somehow
> screwed up' piloting gliders, but any human frailties that may have
> contributed to their deaths don't diminish who they were in my mind. Call it
> putting a human face on otherwise impersonal NTSB accident reports, call it
> pure rationalization, call it what you will, I try to use their perceived
> gaffes to help improve my chances.

One of Feith's presentations uses a picture of burning wreckage with,
he says in his chilling way, 4 dead people inside. The light airplane
had stalled and crashed on takeoff while Greg happened to be at the
same airport so he was at the wreck site within a minute or so.The
flight was on an instrument flight plan in IMC with a ceiling of 600
feet but stalled and crashed before reaching the clouds. He points to
the cover with it's "remove before flight" flag still on the pitot
tube indicating the pilot had no airspeed data.

He then asked the audience if the pilot should have been able to fly
without a reliable ASI. They demur and Greg points out that every
instrument student learns to fly without one - that's why Sporty's
sells black suction disks to cover instruments.

Greg then asked when the pilot should have noticed the malfunctioning
instrument and gets various answers. Greg points out the pilot should
have noticed it before rotation and aborted the takeoff - even going
off the end of the runway would have been survivable. (I used to
carry a small cardboard slide rule which gave me the exact time to Vr
with consideration for density altitude and airplane weight.)

Without saying it is so many words, the damming evidence pilot error
caused 4 deaths is plain to see. Three errors in fact. (1) Failure
to remove pitot cover in the pre-flight. (2) Failure to notice a
malfunctioning instrument on the takeoff roll. (3) Inability to fly
the airplane without an ASI. What more would the NTSB need to say?

One might argue the pilot might have been fatigued or distracted as
possible "outside causes" but that won't do. A pilot is responsible
for a personal pre-flight as well as for the aircraft.

On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 4:45:38 AM UTC-7, kirk.stant wrote:
> On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 1:21:13 AM UTC-5, Ramy wrote:
>
> So I wouldn't consider those as true pilot errors, but as bad luck or outside cause, which happened to safe pilots.
>
> Ramy, I have to disagree a bit. We have remarkably few accidents that are due to mechanical failure out of the control of the pilot - the recent JS-1 rudder cable is apparently one of those. But just about every other glider accident we have seems to be the direct or indirect result of pilot error.
>
> Direct in that the pilot intentionally does something stupid and breaks something.
>
> Indirect in that the pilot does something he doesn't know is stupid (due to poor training or lack of self-education) and breaks something.
>
> Midairs? Sure, it's hard to see another plane - but if we run into each other in a thermal - both pilots looking at the cu instead of clearing where they are going - is that bad luck, lazy lookout, or poor training?
>
> I think of myself as a safe, pilot (opinion not shared with some others, I fear). And I've done some really stupid things in gliders (only dinged one once, slightly). EVERY time I debriefed myself afterwards (as in, "YOU IDIOT, WTF WERE YOU THINKING!") it was pretty easy to see how I worked myself into the position to make a bad decision. That old chain of events is often glaringly obvious after the fact!
>
> My contribution to this safety thing? It's always pilot error. If the pilot hadn't flown the plane, there wouldn't have been an accident. So the pilot has to prepare himself to avoid situations that are dangerous, or if necessary, have the skill to get out of a dangerous situation. Expecting someone else to make you safe is NOT going to work.
>
> Kirk
> 66

I think we all basically saying the same things. My main point was that to really be safer, we need to know better and understand better what kind of problems and mistakes can kill us and how. Will a forgotten tail dolly just embarrass us or can it kill us? What can go wrong if we put a toddler on our laps, should we bother wearing a parachute when not doing aerobatics or contests, etc. Those are just recent examples and perhaps obvious, but there were much less obvious causes. So the point is our poor job in analyzing accidents, sharing the results and finding solutions in a timely manner, rather than the all so lame reaction of "waiting for the NTSB report". This is perhaps the main thing we can do to try to improve our dismay safety record.

Ramy

On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 3:34:27 PM UTC-5, Ramy wrote:
>
> I think we all basically saying the same things. My main point was that to really be safer, we need to know better and understand better what kind of problems and mistakes can kill us and how. Will a forgotten tail dolly just embarrass us or can it kill us? What can go wrong if we put a toddler on our laps, should we bother wearing a parachute when not doing aerobatics or contests, etc. Those are just recent examples and perhaps obvious, but there were much less obvious causes. So the point is our poor job in analyzing accidents, sharing the results and finding solutions in a timely manner, rather than the all so lame reaction of "waiting for the NTSB report". This is perhaps the main thing we can do to try to improve our dismay safety record.
>
> Ramy

Ramy, analysing accidents after they happen is one source of information. But what we need to be doing better is analyzing potential accident scenarios before they happen, and getting a good idea of what can happen. To take your example of the tail dolly - the CG effect can be calculated, and the behaviour of the glider in question at aft CGs can be investigated, so that a good idea of what will happen if a tail dolly is left on can be developed. But there are other issues - the reduced angle of attack during the takeoff and landing roll due to the dolly wheel: longer takeoff roll? Tail first touchdown requiring a faster, flatter "wheel landing"? Loss of directional stability due to castering tailwheel and resulting groundloop if release during takeoff or at end of landing roll?

The military and commercial aviation spent a lot of time developing emergency scenarios and practicing them in simulators (and in flight, by the way). I practice various contingencies in my glider - full spoiler landings, hard over rudder (yes mine will lock over, but easy to push back), bailout sequence, full flap spin entries, unusual attitude to spiral dive recoveries, etc. No-one tells me to do this - I do it because it is fun and keeps me sharper, I hope.

Kirk

On 6/26/2012 2:31 PM, Bill D wrote:

<Major snip...>

> One of Feith's presentations uses a picture of burning wreckage with,
> he says in his chilling way, 4 dead people inside. The light airplane
> had stalled and crashed on takeoff while Greg happened to be at the
> same airport so he was at the wreck site within a minute or so.The
> flight was on an instrument flight plan in IMC with a ceiling of 600
> feet but stalled and crashed before reaching the clouds. He points to
> the cover with it's "remove before flight" flag still on the pitot
> tube indicating the pilot had no airspeed data.
>
> He then asked the audience if the pilot should have been able to fly
> without a reliable ASI. They demur and Greg points out that every
> instrument student learns to fly without one - that's why Sporty's
> sells black suction disks to cover instruments.
>
> Greg then asked when the pilot should have noticed the malfunctioning
> instrument and gets various answers. Greg points out the pilot should
> have noticed it before rotation and aborted the takeoff - even going
> off the end of the runway would have been survivable. (I used to
> carry a small cardboard slide rule which gave me the exact time to Vr
> with consideration for density altitude and airplane weight.)
>
> Without saying it is so many words, the dam[n]ing evidence pilot error
> caused 4 deaths is plain to see. Three errors in fact. (1) Failure
> to remove pitot cover in the pre-flight. (2) Failure to notice a
> malfunctioning instrument on the takeoff roll. (3) Inability to fly
> the airplane without an ASI. What more would the NTSB need to say?
>
> One might argue the pilot might have been fatigued or distracted as
> possible "outside causes" but that won't do. A pilot is responsible
> for a personal pre-flight as well as for the aircraft.
>

"I'm with Feith and Bill D. on this one...all the way!" I might even add a 4th
error: Failure to hit the ground horizontally. But maybe that's just harsh ol'
me...

Though I'm more willing to cut some dead pilots "Fate slack" than is Bill,
tortuous reasoning IS required to deflect causal influences/conclusions away
from Joe PIC.

My first flight with an inop airspeed (it was drizzling heavily when I took
off in a 1-26) happened under my instructor's tutelage. Not until he told me
the ASI probably wouldn't work did the thought enter my skull. (Like all
ab-initio beginners, I was hugely ignorant and essentially completely
dependent on my instructor's judgment at the time.) Though my first
inclination was to exit the cockpit and not fly, I deferred to his laughing
assessment to the effect: "You know what it stalls like and what it sounds
like and what it feels like. Don't fly that slow!"

The ASI quit on the T/O roll, the plane flew as he'd reinforced to me, I
learned a bunch for future reference and never felt I'd been exposed to hasty
or incomplete instruction on the matter. (In hindsight, I suspect instructor
Tom actively connived to expose me to a teachable moment.) Tom had told me
what to expect, noted why I could expect it if I ignored my
senses/experience-to-date, and given me unforgettable, useful, instruction.
(Thanks, Tom!)

Since then I've had other ASI's in various gliders quit aloft (always from
rain), and landed at least one that way that I can recall, and all were
non-events - mentally and in fact.

Aviate. (Fly the stinking airplane!)
Navigate. (Don't hit nuthin'!)
Communicate. (Anything from pointless to potentially useful in multiple ways,
depending...)

Simple, prioritized, and - if implemented - generally effective.

Bob W.

On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 12:54:09 PM UTC-4, soartech wrote:
> So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without
> a single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!

The way it works over time is this: 1)you get hooked on the sport, 2)you become vaguely aware that it's dangerous and that you need to be careful, 3)you come to terms with the fact that it can kill you. 4)A friend or acquaintance gets killed or maimed.

Think about it. If the first thing you learned about soaring was that it can kill you, what would happen? You'd probably plow your thousands of dollars into some really nifty RC model gliders. My copy of Soaring goes to my local library. Maybe somebody will pick it up and take up soaring. Don't list the departed souls.

Soaring Magazine has a lot in it every month about the hazards of soaring, but it's almost always hypothetical. A simple tally sheet of crashes and injuries would drive the point home without anyone getting sued. But the SSA chooses to not do that. Why? It's a glaring omission. THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES. When you suggest that there is something wrong with this picture, you get a knee-jerk reaction. Wierd.

Someone tell me why there is never a tally of accidents in Soaring Magazine..

On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 4:05:48 PM UTC-7, son_of_flubber wrote:
> On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 12:54:09 PM UTC-4, soartech wrote:
> > So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without
> > a single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!
>
> The way it works over time is this: 1)you get hooked on the sport, 2)you become vaguely aware that it's dangerous and that you need to be careful, 3)you come to terms with the fact that it can kill you. 4)A friend or acquaintance gets killed or maimed.
>
> Think about it. If the first thing you learned about soaring was that it can kill you, what would happen? You'd probably plow your thousands of dollars into some really nifty RC model gliders. My copy of Soaring goes to my local library. Maybe somebody will pick it up and take up soaring. Don't list the departed souls.
>
> Soaring Magazine has a lot in it every month about the hazards of soaring, but it's almost always hypothetical. A simple tally sheet of crashes and injuries would drive the point home without anyone getting sued. But the SSA chooses to not do that. Why? It's a glaring omission. THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES. When you suggest that there is something wrong with this picture, you get a knee-jerk reaction. Wierd.
>
> Someone tell me why there is never a tally of accidents in Soaring Magazine.

Good points, although there used to be a regular accident column written by Thelen until few years ago. Since then there is an occasional accident report.
But indeed many of us picked up soaring since we were told that it is safer than driving to the airport. By the time we realized the truth, we were already hooked. I would probably still flying hang gliders today if I knew back then that sailplanes are more dangerous. But I have no regrets. I understand the risks and willing to take them to be able to enjoy this amazing sport. But I am sure that most new pilots and ride passengers do not understand the risks.

Ramy

On Jun 26, 4:05*pm, son_of_flubber > wrote:
> On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 12:54:09 PM UTC-4, soartech wrote:
> > So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without
> > a single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!
>
> The way it works over time is this: 1)you get hooked on the sport, 2)you become vaguely aware that it's dangerous and that you need to be careful, 3)you come to terms with the fact that it can kill you. *4)A friend or acquaintance gets killed or maimed.
>
> Think about it. *If the first thing you learned about soaring was that it can kill you, what would happen? *You'd probably plow your thousands of dollars into some really nifty RC model gliders. *My copy of Soaring goes to my local library. *Maybe somebody will pick it up and take up soaring. *Don't list the departed souls.
>
> Soaring Magazine has a lot in it every month about the hazards of soaring, but it's almost always hypothetical. *A simple tally sheet of crashes and injuries would drive the point home without anyone getting sued. *But the SSA chooses to not do that. *Why? It's a glaring omission. *THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES. *When you suggest that there is something wrong with this picture, you get a knee-jerk reaction. Wierd.
>
> Someone tell me why there is never a tally of accidents in Soaring Magazine.

When we had 2 of our club members collided in a mid-air the result was
finger pointing at the pilots (non-CFIG) who mentored them. It was
intimated that they were not ready for this kind of activity and that
those of us that actively flew in the mountains were somehow
responsible for encouraging them to do something they were not "ready"
for. Ironically some of those who criticized the most were the ones
who never left the vicinity of the airport, unless they were flying a
motorglider.

Another club member spun his motorglider into an unfamiliar field. He
was a low time pilot in a brand new ship with less than 20 hours on
it............he felt the need to try flying a "new" site, took a
check ride in that clubs Blanik (a sailplane he was very familiar
with) and did a great job. After soaring his TST-Atlas for several
hours he came back, did a Blanik approach in a 40:1 ship, realized at
mid-field he was to high and tried to do either a 360 or a 180, we'll
never know because he spun it in and killed himself.

Last year one of our CFIG's died during the filming of the "Cadillac"
commercial. There was a "list" of incidents that took place that made
it out thru the gossip channels that raised some eyebrows. None of
that was shared publicly (as far as I know) and none was shared within
the clubs official channels.

I'm pretty sure that some open, honest and heartfelt discussions about
all these accidents could have really benefited our club. Instead all
that was mentioned was how great these pilots all were, how careful
they were and how they had tons of experience....................which
was seen as somewhat ironic by those of us that personally knew them.

This is the culture we need to change.

Brad

On Jun 26, 5:27*pm, Ramy > wrote:
> On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 4:05:48 PM UTC-7, son_of_flubber wrote:
> > On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 12:54:09 PM UTC-4, soartech wrote:
> > > So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without
> > > a single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!
>
> > The way it works over time is this: 1)you get hooked on the sport, 2)you become vaguely aware that it's dangerous and that you need to be careful, 3)you come to terms with the fact that it can kill you. *4)A friend or acquaintance gets killed or maimed.
>
> > Think about it. *If the first thing you learned about soaring was that it can kill you, what would happen? *You'd probably plow your thousands of dollars into some really nifty RC model gliders. *My copy of Soaring goes to my local library. *Maybe somebody will pick it up and take up soaring. *Don't list the departed souls.
>
> > Soaring Magazine has a lot in it every month about the hazards of soaring, but it's almost always hypothetical. *A simple tally sheet of crashes and injuries would drive the point home without anyone getting sued. *But the SSA chooses to not do that. *Why? It's a glaring omission. *THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES. *When you suggest that there is something wrong with this picture, you get a knee-jerk reaction. Wierd.
>
> > Someone tell me why there is never a tally of accidents in Soaring Magazine.
>
> Good points, although there used to be a regular accident column written by Thelen until few years ago. Since then there is an occasional accident report.
> But indeed many of us picked up soaring since we were told that it is safer than driving to the airport. By the time we realized the truth, we were already hooked. I would probably still flying hang gliders today if I knew back then that sailplanes are more dangerous. But I have no regrets. I understand the risks and willing to take them to be able to enjoy this amazing sport. But I am sure that most new pilots and ride passengers do not understand the risks.
>
> Ramy

It really sounds if you want someone else to look out for you. It
isn't going to happen - you're on your own. If you can't deal with
that, maybe RC gliders are better for you.

Gliders rarely hurt anyone. Pilots, on the other hand, have hurt
many, many gliders. Saying "soaring is dangerous" is nonsense -
dangerous nonsense. It detracts from careless and unprepared pilots
who ARE dangerous. 99.9 % of the time, one millisecond before impact,
it was a perfectly airworthy glider. The glider didn't put itself in
that position, the pilot did.

If you are going to get hurt, there's a 99.9% chance it will be your
fault. Don't blame soaring for that.

There's a wonderful old WWII era saying that goes, "The 99% of air
crashes are caused by a LOOSE NUT ON THE CONTROL STICK meaning the
pilot. Even then, pilots were the weak link.

Do new pilots understand this? They damn well better. It's part of
their basic training.

Agh, I give up. Every attempt to try to say something about the need for better safety culture will encounter resistant from those who claim there is nothing wrong with the system and the only problem is the pilots. I guess this is their way of convincing themselves they safe since they will never do such mistakes themselves.
Good luck.

Ramy ( who does NOT need anyone to look after him)

On Jun 26, 9:11*pm, Ramy > wrote:
> Agh, I give up. Every attempt to try to say something about the need for better safety culture will encounter resistant from those who claim there is nothing wrong with the system and the only problem is the pilots. I guess this is their way of convincing themselves they safe since they will never do such mistakes themselves.
> Good luck.
>
> Ramy ( who does NOT need anyone to look after him)

One group of pilots here in the US believe that they are sufficiently
trained to avoid making the stupid errors that cause others to end up
in the accident reports. Any pilot who makes this sort of error and
crashes, obviously did not have the skills necessary to be safe in
this sport. A rigorous training regimen, taught only by elite
instructors, will provide training to levels sufficient to address all
possible circumstances encountered during soaring flight. This will
result in soaring being safer than any other form of aviation, at
least for the 100 or so pilots left.

A second group of pilots likely remember times when they were lucky to
recover from situations in which their skill and experience levels
were nearly overwhelmed. Say, things that sometimes happened at the
ends of long days of flying, perhaps aided by a bit of dehydration or
hypoxia, a bit distracted by encountering something unexpected, or
just a touch of complacency because they have final glide nailed. Add
a momentary lapse of situational awareness, missing the clue that
suggests things aren't going to work out quite as expected, etc., and
suddenly one is staring into the abyss. A greater willingness in the
community to talk honestly talk about mistakes that they and others
make, would lead to increased levels of safety. There is always going
to be some amount of risk, as humans are not perfect.

The obvious solution, of course, is for the pilots in the first group
to convince the pilots in the second group to retire from soaring ;^)

Marc

On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 11:11:29 PM UTC-5, Ramy wrote:
> Agh, I give up. Every attempt to try to say something about the need for better safety culture will encounter resistant from those who claim there is nothing wrong with the system and the only problem is the pilots. I guess this is their way of convincing themselves they safe since they will never do such mistakes themselves.
> Good luck.
>
> Ramy ( who does NOT need anyone to look after him)

Then what are you asking for? There is a LOT of safety information and training available. Many old, experienced pilots still around. Good instructors.

What culture would you impose? How would you enforce it?

The only group in soaring that really enforces a safety culture is, oddly enough, the racing community - parachutes, ELTs, radios, FLARM, skill requirements, training camps, etc. - If the rest of the soaring community had the same requirements, it might improve safety.

Or not.

Bottom line. Our gliders are incredibly safe. Pilots are not. Our initial and recurrent training system is minimal, and requires individual commitment to learn and practice safe soaring.

If you know how to fix that - please let us know! It gets old having to lie about how safe our sport really is!

Meanwhile, I'm not waiting for someone else to make me safer. I'll do that myself, thankyou.

Kirk
66

On Monday, June 25, 2012 11:11:59 AM UTC-5, BobW wrote:
> I might be wrong, but my sense is that now in this soaring season, and
> considering *only* quantity of gliders "substantially damaged" or worse, few
> semi-regular, US-based, RAS readers would not agree this U.S. season is -
> statistical pedantry aside - already distinctly worse-than-recent-years.
>
> Non-midair ship-damage-inflicted hasn't apparently (if still-TBD in some
> cases) been limited to uncurrent, inexperienced (total, or in-type) pilots,
> or, been an exclusive function of 'bad luck' associated with off-field landings.
>
> Some fundamental questions:
> - why aren't we pilots as a group more considerate of our expensive equipment?
> - why intentionally shave margins thin in the absence of a compelling reason
> to do so...and awareness we ARE doing so?
> - have any readers/contributors had (near) incidents in which neither
> time-in-type (absence of) or currency (lack of) or 'obvious outside factors'
> were factors, and if so, what *were* contributing factors?
>
> Perhaps a wide-ranging, open, discussion of 'the whole safety thing' might be
> worthwhile, both here and within our clubs. All pilots (presumably) believe
> themselves sufficiently safe as to be unlikely to be PIC in anything other
> than a 'pure bad luck' related accident/incident. There may be a few readers
> who've even been involved in such.
>
> But my personal 1st-hand experience, combined with a long-standing interest in
> learning from the gaffes/unluckiness of other pilots, leads to the personal
> conclusion the majority of crunches are NOT 'pure bad luck.' The good news
> (considering only my personal experiences) is I've not been a repeat offender,
> insofar as 'primary contributors' are concerned. Nonetheless, for me, pushing
> weather limits has been one obvious potential "Gotcha!" (Duh!) Big surprise,
> given the nature of sport soaring. That said, none of my 3 scratch-n-dent
> inducing incidents had weather as a contributor...well, other than, in 2 of
> the 3, by inducing soarability, I mean.
>
> For better or worse, I early-on in my PIC-ing concluded I'd be much
> happier/safer avoiding crunches, incidents, etc., than trying to explain or
> justify how they happened, point being that I actively THOUGHT ABOUT the
> possibility I COULD be involved in such. I think the belief not only helped
> power/fine-tune my "situational awareness" radar, but favorably influenced all
> my future piloting, gliderporting, driving, bicycling, urban pedestrianing,
> etc. experiences. Personal safety culture, if you will. And no, I don't
> consider my outlook an inoculation against personal lapses of
> attention...though I do believe my outlook distinctly decreases the chances
> I'll be involved in a self-inflicted incident or accident. (So far, so good!)
>
> What do others think?
>
> Bob W.



On Monday, June 25, 2012 11:11:59 AM UTC-5, BobW wrote:
> I might be wrong, but my sense is that now in this soaring season, and
> considering *only* quantity of gliders "substantially damaged" or worse, few
> semi-regular, US-based, RAS readers would not agree this U.S. season is -
> statistical pedantry aside - already distinctly worse-than-recent-years.
>
> Non-midair ship-damage-inflicted hasn't apparently (if still-TBD in some
> cases) been limited to uncurrent, inexperienced (total, or in-type) pilots,
> or, been an exclusive function of 'bad luck' associated with off-field landings.
>
> Some fundamental questions:
> - why aren't we pilots as a group more considerate of our expensive equipment?
> - why intentionally shave margins thin in the absence of a compelling reason
> to do so...and awareness we ARE doing so?
> - have any readers/contributors had (near) incidents in which neither
> time-in-type (absence of) or currency (lack of) or 'obvious outside factors'
> were factors, and if so, what *were* contributing factors?
>
> Perhaps a wide-ranging, open, discussion of 'the whole safety thing' might be
> worthwhile, both here and within our clubs. All pilots (presumably) believe
> themselves sufficiently safe as to be unlikely to be PIC in anything other
> than a 'pure bad luck' related accident/incident. There may be a few readers
> who've even been involved in such.
>
> But my personal 1st-hand experience, combined with a long-standing interest in
> learning from the gaffes/unluckiness of other pilots, leads to the personal
> conclusion the majority of crunches are NOT 'pure bad luck.' The good news
> (considering only my personal experiences) is I've not been a repeat offender,
> insofar as 'primary contributors' are concerned. Nonetheless, for me, pushing
> weather limits has been one obvious potential "Gotcha!" (Duh!) Big surprise,
> given the nature of sport soaring. That said, none of my 3 scratch-n-dent
> inducing incidents had weather as a contributor...well, other than, in 2 of
> the 3, by inducing soarability, I mean.
>
> For better or worse, I early-on in my PIC-ing concluded I'd be much
> happier/safer avoiding crunches, incidents, etc., than trying to explain or
> justify how they happened, point being that I actively THOUGHT ABOUT the
> possibility I COULD be involved in such. I think the belief not only helped
> power/fine-tune my "situational awareness" radar, but favorably influenced all
> my future piloting, gliderporting, driving, bicycling, urban pedestrianing,
> etc. experiences. Personal safety culture, if you will. And no, I don't
> consider my outlook an inoculation against personal lapses of
> attention...though I do believe my outlook distinctly decreases the chances
> I'll be involved in a self-inflicted incident or accident. (So far, so good!)
>
> What do others think?
>
> Bob W.



On Monday, June 25, 2012 11:11:59 AM UTC-5, BobW wrote:
> I might be wrong, but my sense is that now in this soaring season, and
> considering *only* quantity of gliders "substantially damaged" or worse, few
> semi-regular, US-based, RAS readers would not agree this U.S. season is -
> statistical pedantry aside - already distinctly worse-than-recent-years.
>
> Non-midair ship-damage-inflicted hasn't apparently (if still-TBD in some
> cases) been limited to uncurrent, inexperienced (total, or in-type) pilots,
> or, been an exclusive function of 'bad luck' associated with off-field landings.
>
> Some fundamental questions:
> - why aren't we pilots as a group more considerate of our expensive equipment?
> - why intentionally shave margins thin in the absence of a compelling reason
> to do so...and awareness we ARE doing so?
> - have any readers/contributors had (near) incidents in which neither
> time-in-type (absence of) or currency (lack of) or 'obvious outside factors'
> were factors, and if so, what *were* contributing factors?
>
> Perhaps a wide-ranging, open, discussion of 'the whole safety thing' might be
> worthwhile, both here and within our clubs. All pilots (presumably) believe
> themselves sufficiently safe as to be unlikely to be PIC in anything other
> than a 'pure bad luck' related accident/incident. There may be a few readers
> who've even been involved in such.
>
> But my personal 1st-hand experience, combined with a long-standing interest in
> learning from the gaffes/unluckiness of other pilots, leads to the personal
> conclusion the majority of crunches are NOT 'pure bad luck.' The good news
> (considering only my personal experiences) is I've not been a repeat offender,
> insofar as 'primary contributors' are concerned. Nonetheless, for me, pushing
> weather limits has been one obvious potential "Gotcha!" (Duh!) Big surprise,
> given the nature of sport soaring. That said, none of my 3 scratch-n-dent
> inducing incidents had weather as a contributor...well, other than, in 2 of
> the 3, by inducing soarability, I mean.
>
> For better or worse, I early-on in my PIC-ing concluded I'd be much
> happier/safer avoiding crunches, incidents, etc., than trying to explain or
> justify how they happened, point being that I actively THOUGHT ABOUT the
> possibility I COULD be involved in such. I think the belief not only helped
> power/fine-tune my "situational awareness" radar, but favorably influenced all
> my future piloting, gliderporting, driving, bicycling, urban pedestrianing,
> etc. experiences. Personal safety culture, if you will. And no, I don't
> consider my outlook an inoculation against personal lapses of
> attention...though I do believe my outlook distinctly decreases the chances
> I'll be involved in a self-inflicted incident or accident. (So far, so good!)
>
> What do others think?
>
> Bob W.

On Tue, 26 Jun 2012 23:56:22 -0700 (PDT), Marc >
wrote:

>One group of pilots here in the US believe that they are sufficiently
>trained to avoid making the stupid errors[.....]
>result in soaring being safer than any other form of aviation, at
>least for the 100 or so pilots left.
[...]
>The obvious solution, of course, is for the pilots in the first group
>to convince the pilots in the second group to retire from soaring ;^)


Occasionally, also some of the most experienced and safest pilots
(based on a long, immaculate safety record), crash.
Too much confidence, too small safety margins (margins? doh!), or just
a plain, simple lapse of the moment.
This can happen to anyone, and that's when we need margins. Most
probably, we will not be grateful to those safety margins, as we won't
recognize they saved us on that occasion.

aldo cernezzi

On Jun 27, 7:22*am, cernauta > wrote:
> On Tue, 26 Jun 2012 23:56:22 -0700 (PDT), Marc >
> wrote:
>
>
>
> >One group of pilots here in the US believe that they are sufficiently
> >trained to avoid making the stupid errors[.....]
> >result in soaring being safer than any other form of aviation, at
> >least for the 100 or so pilots left.
> [...]
> >The obvious solution, of course, is for the pilots in the first group
> >to convince the pilots in the second group to retire from soaring ;^)
>
> Occasionally, also some of the most experienced and safest pilots
> (based on a long, immaculate safety record), crash.
> Too much confidence, too small safety margins (margins? doh!), or just
> a plain, simple lapse of the moment.
> This can happen to anyone, and that's when we need margins. Most
> probably, we will not be grateful to those safety margins, as we won't
> recognize they saved us on that occasion.
>
> aldo cernezzi

Aldo is right. It's those margins which give us the opportunity to
recover from a "whoops" moment. Those experienced pilots who do crash
seem to have made an unconscious decision they no longer need safety
margins. That's a subtle but deadly decision we all need to avoid.
The absence of a 'Plan B' is clue to understanding what happened.

On 6/27/2012 12:56 AM, Marc wrote:
> On Jun 26, 9:11 pm, Ramy > wrote:
>> Agh, I give up. Every attempt to try to say something about the need for
>> better safety culture will encounter resistant from those who claim there
>> is nothing wrong with the system and the only problem is the pilots. I
>> guess this is their way of convincing themselves they safe since they
>> will never do such mistakes themselves. Good luck.
>>
>> Ramy ( who does NOT need anyone to look after him)
>
> One group of pilots here in the US believe that they are sufficiently
> trained to avoid making the stupid errors that cause others to end up in
> the accident reports. Any pilot who makes this sort of error and crashes,
> obviously did not have the skills necessary to be safe in this sport. A
> rigorous training regimen, taught only by elite instructors, will provide
> training to levels sufficient to address all possible circumstances
> encountered during soaring flight. This will result in soaring being safer
> than any other form of aviation, at least for the 100 or so pilots left.
>
> A second group of pilots likely remember times when they were lucky to
> recover from situations in which their skill and experience levels were
> nearly overwhelmed. Say, things that sometimes happened at the ends of
> long days of flying, perhaps aided by a bit of dehydration or hypoxia, a
> bit distracted by encountering something unexpected, or just a touch of
> complacency because they have final glide nailed. Add a momentary lapse of
> situational awareness, missing the clue that suggests things aren't going
> to work out quite as expected, etc., and suddenly one is staring into the
> abyss. A greater willingness in the community to talk honestly talk about
> mistakes that they and others make, would lead to increased levels of
> safety. There is always going to be some amount of risk, as humans are not
> perfect.
>
> The obvious solution, of course, is for the pilots in the first group to
> convince the pilots in the second group to retire from soaring ;^)
>
> Marc
>

Great discussion! (Yeah, I know - as the one who started this thread - I can
be accused of 'priming the pump' or 'self promotion' or something else
disparaging, but I don't care.)
- - - - - -

Ramy - I think I can understand "where you're coming from" insofar as wanting
to see "a better safety culture" within our amazing sport. Brad's observations
seem to me to bear out the - not universal, to be sure, but IMHO undoubtedly
real - need.

I also think I understand where Bill D. and Kirk are coming from, which is to
say (without intending to put words in their mouths) both seem to me to be
opining from the perspective of people who've already concluded "it's obvious
Joe PIC is the fundamental problem (a perspective with which I agree)...(and
by implication,) hasn't everyone else already concluded the same?" Clearly
that latter can never be the case, as provable to every reader who can
remember their original ignorance about flying and safety.

IOW, in this thread-to-date I haven't detected a fundamental disagreement as
to individual attitudes toward "the heart of piloting safety" so much as I
sense (unsurprising) differences in assessments of what might "best be done to
improve soaring's safety stats."

FWIW, I always encourage everyone who feels strongly about something to do
their best to change/improve things. My rationale is the effort might in time
prove to have zero effect, but if no effort is put out at all, then you're
*guaranteed* of having no effect. Shoot, this very thread reflects application
of my rationale! :-)
- - - - - -

Marc - Chortle! Pretty darned accurate simplification, methinks.
- - - - - -

Everyone - thanks for chiming in! Any silent fence-sitters? Please!! Share
your thoughts, too.

Bob W.

On 6/26/2012 5:39 PM, Brad wrote:
> On Jun 26, 4:05 pm, son_of_flubber > wrote:
>> On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 12:54:09 PM UTC-4, soartech wrote:
>>> So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without a
>>> single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!
>>
>> The way it works over time is this: 1)you get hooked on the sport, 2)you
>> become vaguely aware that it's dangerous and that you need to be careful,
>> 3)you come to terms with the fact that it can kill you. 4)A friend or
>> acquaintance gets killed or maimed.
>>
>> Think about it. If the first thing you learned about soaring was that it
>> can kill you, what would happen? You'd probably plow your thousands of
>> dollars into some really nifty RC model gliders. My copy of Soaring goes
>> to my local library. Maybe somebody will pick it up and take up soaring.
>> Don't list the departed souls.
>>
>> Soaring Magazine has a lot in it every month about the hazards of
>> soaring, but it's almost always hypothetical. A simple tally sheet of
>> crashes and injuries would drive the point home without anyone getting
>> sued. But the SSA chooses to not do that. Why? It's a glaring omission.
>> THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES. When you suggest that there is something
>> wrong with this picture, you get a knee-jerk reaction. Wierd.
>>
>> Someone tell me why there is never a tally of accidents in Soaring
>> Magazine.
>
> When we had 2 of our club members collided in a mid-air the result was
> finger pointing at the pilots (non-CFIG) who mentored them. It was
> intimated that they were not ready for this kind of activity and that those
> of us that actively flew in the mountains were somehow responsible for
> encouraging them to do something they were not "ready" for. Ironically some
> of those who criticized the most were the ones who never left the vicinity
> of the airport, unless they were flying a motorglider.
>
> Another club member spun his motorglider into an unfamiliar field. He was a
> low time pilot in a brand new ship with less than 20 hours on
> it............he felt the need to try flying a "new" site, took a check
> ride in that clubs Blanik (a sailplane he was very familiar with) and did a
> great job. After soaring his TST-Atlas for several hours he came back, did
> a Blanik approach in a 40:1 ship, realized at mid-field he was to high and
> tried to do either a 360 or a 180, we'll never know because he spun it in
> and killed himself.
>
> Last year one of our CFIG's died during the filming of the "Cadillac"
> commercial. There was a "list" of incidents that took place that made it
> out thru the gossip channels that raised some eyebrows. None of that was
> shared publicly (as far as I know) and none was shared within the clubs
> official channels.
>
> I'm pretty sure that some open, honest and heartfelt discussions about all
> these accidents could have really benefited our club. Instead all that was
> mentioned was how great these pilots all were, how careful they were and
> how they had tons of experience....................which was seen as
> somewhat ironic by those of us that personally knew them.
>
> This is the culture we need to change.
>
> Brad

"What Brad said!!!" Certain micro-cultures are "obviously sub-optimum."

I've been a member of the same soaring club for 20+ years, and varyingly
intimately familiar with it for over 36 years. In that time I've watched its
"personality" (culture, if you will) evolve. Historically, my club's
personality change has occurred slowly over time...except when
(safety-related) issues arose which simply could not be ignored. I can recall
at least twice when (poor/ugly) safety-related issues "forced
introspection/change". Actually, all it "forced" was "cheap talk", but a
topical part of the cheap talk quickly became the need (or not) for cultural
change.

In neither case was the club seriously at risk of folding...but in both cases
it was a painful, protracted (in the pain sense) yet brief (in the objective
passage of time sense), process that resulted in years' long "cultural change"
that benefited the club and arguably prevented it from continuing to add
incidents/accidents to national stats. In any event, the club's stats clearly
reflected a before-change/after-change effect, when measured over multi-year
periods.

The second instance's effects still appear to be part of the club's normal
culture more than a decade after the need for change became unignorable...and
(IMHO) that's a good thing!

Perfection? Not a chance. Improvement (stats and culture)? Darn tootin'!
- - - - - -

While making no claims for having a guaranteed recipe for "change success,"
the analytical part of me thinks it saw in both instances some things that may
have been crucial in overcoming varied and obvious obstacles to change, e.g.:
personalities; hurt feelings; inertia; denial; personality-based cliques; etc.

These include: persistence; discussionally remaining (as in relentlessly
returning to being) "on topic"; patience (letting people speak, willingness to
not settle everything in a single meeting or night or session); mutual respect
(agreeing to disagree; calling out/cutting off ad-hominem arguments the
instant they appeared).

But perhaps THE crucial element in both instances was having at least one
"club leader" (officer, board member, etc.) sufficiently motivated to
"oversee"/push the process forward until the consensus was a consensus had
been reached. None of this "fizzling out" nonsense allowed.

I've also some first hand experience with a club which could benefit itself,
the sport of soaring, and probably its safety record if "it effected some sort
of internal cultural change(s?)" but which has been "board resistant" to such
change over decades. Terribly unfortunate. IMO.

Bob W.

Why do high time pilots have accidents?

Some would say this proves the sport itself is dangerous. Some might
say it's arrogance.

I would disagree with both. I think it's a subtle, unconscious
reduction in safety margins as experience is gained. If it were a
conscious decision to cut margins, it could be addressed with
counseling and additional training. If the pilot doesn't realize his
safety margins are thinning, it can be hard to deal with.

The key starting point for all of us is to realize experience itself
is not a safety margin. Safety margins are things like speed,
altitude and options in hand - in other words, they're quantifiable.

An example might be consistent low and slow approaches perhaps because
the pilot wants to stop in front of his trailer. Having been
successful for a season or two, this has become the new normal
approach. As long as he doesn't encounter unexpected severe sink, it
will continue to work - but there's no safety margin, no Plan B, no
self-questioning, "What if this doesn't work?"

If you always fly with generous safety margins, you control your own
destiny. The thinner the safety margins get, the more you gamble.
"It's like playing Russian Roulette" a friend said over lunch, "Note
there are no world class Russian Roulette players."


On Jun 27, 2:18*pm, Bob Whelan > wrote:
> On 6/26/2012 5:39 PM, Brad wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Jun 26, 4:05 pm, son_of_flubber > wrote:
> >> On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 12:54:09 PM UTC-4, soartech wrote:
> >>> So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without a
> >>> single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!
>
> >> The way it works over time is this: 1)you get hooked on the sport, 2)you
> >> become vaguely aware that it's dangerous and that you need to be careful,
> >> 3)you come to terms with the fact that it can kill you. *4)A friend or
> >> acquaintance gets killed or maimed.
>
> >> Think about it. *If the first thing you learned about soaring was that it
> >> can kill you, what would happen? *You'd probably plow your thousands of
> >> dollars into some really nifty RC model gliders. *My copy of Soaring goes
> >> to my local library. *Maybe somebody will pick it up and take up soaring.
> >> Don't list the departed souls.
>
> >> Soaring Magazine has a lot in it every month about the hazards of
> >> soaring, but it's almost always hypothetical. *A simple tally sheet of
> >> crashes and injuries would drive the point home without anyone getting
> >> sued. *But the SSA chooses to not do that. *Why? It's a glaring omission.
> >> THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES. *When you suggest that there is something
> >> wrong with this picture, you get a knee-jerk reaction. Wierd.
>
> >> Someone tell me why there is never a tally of accidents in Soaring
> >> Magazine.
>
> > When we had 2 of our club members collided in a mid-air the result was
> > finger pointing at the pilots (non-CFIG) who mentored them. It was
> > intimated that they were not ready for this kind of activity and that those
> > of us that actively flew in the mountains were somehow responsible for
> > encouraging them to do something they were not "ready" for. Ironically some
> > of those who criticized the most were the ones who never left the vicinity
> > of the airport, unless they were flying a motorglider.
>
> > Another club member spun his motorglider into an unfamiliar field. He was a
> > low time pilot in a brand new ship with less than 20 hours on
> > it............he felt the need to try flying a "new" site, took a check
> > ride in that clubs Blanik (a sailplane he was very familiar with) and did a
> > great job. After soaring his TST-Atlas for several hours he came back, did
> > a Blanik approach in a 40:1 ship, realized at mid-field he was to high and
> > tried to do either a 360 or a 180, we'll never know because he spun it in
> > and killed himself.
>
> > Last year one of our CFIG's died during the filming of the "Cadillac"
> > commercial. There was a "list" of incidents that took place that made it
> > out thru the gossip channels that raised some eyebrows. None of that was
> > shared publicly (as far as I know) and none was shared within the clubs
> > official channels.
>
> > I'm pretty sure that some open, honest and heartfelt discussions about all
> > these accidents could have really benefited our club. Instead all that was
> > mentioned was how great these pilots all were, how careful they were and
> > how they had tons of experience....................which was seen as
> > somewhat ironic by those of us that personally knew them.
>
> > This is the culture we need to change.
>
> > Brad
>
> "What Brad said!!!" Certain micro-cultures are "obviously sub-optimum."
>
> I've been a member of the same soaring club for 20+ years, and varyingly
> intimately familiar with it for over 36 years. In that time I've watched its
> "personality" (culture, if you will) evolve. Historically, my club's
> personality change has occurred slowly over time...except when
> (safety-related) issues arose which simply could not be ignored. I can recall
> at least twice when (poor/ugly) safety-related issues "forced
> introspection/change". Actually, all it "forced" was "cheap talk", but a
> topical part of the cheap talk quickly became the need (or not) for cultural
> change.
>
> In neither case was the club seriously at risk of folding...but in both cases
> it was a painful, protracted (in the pain sense) yet brief (in the objective
> passage of time sense), process that resulted in years' long "cultural change"
> that benefited the club and arguably prevented it from continuing to add
> incidents/accidents to national stats. In any event, the club's stats clearly
> reflected a before-change/after-change effect, when measured over multi-year
> periods.
>
> The second instance's effects still appear to be part of the club's normal
> culture more than a decade after the need for change became unignorable....and
> (IMHO) that's a good thing!
>
> Perfection? Not a chance. Improvement (stats and culture)? Darn tootin'!
> - - - - - -
>
> While making no claims for having a guaranteed recipe for "change success,"
> the analytical part of me thinks it saw in both instances some things that may
> have been crucial in overcoming varied and obvious obstacles to change, e..g.:
> personalities; hurt feelings; inertia; denial; personality-based cliques; etc.
>
> These include: persistence; discussionally remaining (as in relentlessly
> returning to being) "on topic"; patience (letting people speak, willingness to
> not settle everything in a single meeting or night or session); mutual respect
> (agreeing to disagree; calling out/cutting off ad-hominem arguments the
> instant they appeared).
>
> But perhaps THE crucial element in both instances was having at least one
> "club leader" (officer, board member, etc.) sufficiently motivated to
> "oversee"/push the process forward until the consensus was a consensus had
> been reached. None of this "fizzling out" nonsense allowed.
>
> I've also some first hand experience with a club which could benefit itself,
> the sport of soaring, and probably its safety record if "it effected some sort
> of internal cultural change(s?)" but which has been "board resistant" to such
> change over decades. Terribly unfortunate. IMO.
>
> Bob W.

At 20:18 27 June 2012, Bob Whelan wrote:
>On 6/26/2012 5:39 PM, Brad wrote:
>> On Jun 26, 4:05 pm, son_of_flubber wrote:
>>> On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 12:54:09 PM UTC-4, soartech wrote:
>>>> So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without

a
>>>> single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!
>>>
>>> The way it works over time is this: 1)you get hooked on the sport,
2)you
>>> become vaguely aware that it's dangerous and that you need to be
>careful,
>>> 3)you come to terms with the fact that it can kill you. 4)A friend or
>>> acquaintance gets killed or maimed.
>>>
>>> Think about it. If the first thing you learned about soaring was that
>it
>>> can kill you, what would happen? You'd probably plow your thousands
of
>>> dollars into some really nifty RC model gliders. My copy of Soaring
>goes
>>> to my local library. Maybe somebody will pick it up and take up
>soaring.
>>> Don't list the departed souls.
>>>
>>> Soaring Magazine has a lot in it every month about the hazards of
>>> soaring, but it's almost always hypothetical. A simple tally sheet of
>>> crashes and injuries would drive the point home without anyone getting
>>> sued. But the SSA chooses to not do that. Why? It's a glaring
>omission.
>>> THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES. When you suggest that there is
something
>>> wrong with this picture, you get a knee-jerk reaction. Wierd.
>>>
>>> Someone tell me why there is never a tally of accidents in Soaring
>>> Magazine.
>>
>> When we had 2 of our club members collided in a mid-air the result was
>> finger pointing at the pilots (non-CFIG) who mentored them. It was
>> intimated that they were not ready for this kind of activity and that
>those
>> of us that actively flew in the mountains were somehow responsible for
>> encouraging them to do something they were not "ready" for. Ironically
>some
>> of those who criticized the most were the ones who never left the
>vicinity
>> of the airport, unless they were flying a motorglider.
>>
>> Another club member spun his motorglider into an unfamiliar field. He
was
>a
>> low time pilot in a brand new ship with less than 20 hours on
>> it............he felt the need to try flying a "new" site, took a check
>> ride in that clubs Blanik (a sailplane he was very familiar with) and
did
>a
>> great job. After soaring his TST-Atlas for several hours he came back,
>did
>> a Blanik approach in a 40:1 ship, realized at mid-field he was to high
>and
>> tried to do either a 360 or a 180, we'll never know because he spun it
in
>> and killed himself.
>>
>> Last year one of our CFIG's died during the filming of the "Cadillac"
>> commercial. There was a "list" of incidents that took place that made
it
>> out thru the gossip channels that raised some eyebrows. None of that
was
>> shared publicly (as far as I know) and none was shared within the clubs
>> official channels.
>>
>> I'm pretty sure that some open, honest and heartfelt discussions about
>all
>> these accidents could have really benefited our club. Instead all that
>was
>> mentioned was how great these pilots all were, how careful they were
and
>> how they had tons of experience....................which was seen as
>> somewhat ironic by those of us that personally knew them.
>>
>> This is the culture we need to change.
>>
>> Brad
>
>"What Brad said!!!" Certain micro-cultures are "obviously sub-optimum."
>
>I've been a member of the same soaring club for 20+ years, and varyingly
>intimately familiar with it for over 36 years. In that time I've watched
>its
>"personality" (culture, if you will) evolve. Historically, my club's
>personality change has occurred slowly over time...except when
>(safety-related) issues arose which simply could not be ignored. I can
>recall
>at least twice when (poor/ugly) safety-related issues "forced
>introspection/change". Actually, all it "forced" was "cheap talk", but a
>topical part of the cheap talk quickly became the need (or not) for
>cultural
>change.
>
>In neither case was the club seriously at risk of folding...but in both
>cases
>it was a painful, protracted (in the pain sense) yet brief (in the
>objective
>passage of time sense), process that resulted in years' long "cultural
>change"
>that benefited the club and arguably prevented it from continuing to add
>incidents/accidents to national stats. In any event, the club's stats
>clearly
>reflected a before-change/after-change effect, when measured over
>multi-year
>periods.
>
>The second instance's effects still appear to be part of the club's normal

>culture more than a decade after the need for change became
>unignorable...and
>(IMHO) that's a good thing!
>
>Perfection? Not a chance. Improvement (stats and culture)? Darn tootin'!
>- - - - - -
>
>While making no claims for having a guaranteed recipe for "change
success,"
>
>the analytical part of me thinks it saw in both instances some things
that
>may
>have been crucial in overcoming varied and obvious obstacles to change,
>e.g.:
>personalities; hurt feelings; inertia; denial; personality-based cliques;
>etc.
>
>These include: persistence; discussionally remaining (as in relentlessly
>returning to being) "on topic"; patience (letting people speak,
willingness
>to
>not settle everything in a single meeting or night or session); mutual
>respect
>(agreeing to disagree; calling out/cutting off ad-hominem arguments the
>instant they appeared).
>
>But perhaps THE crucial element in both instances was having at least one

>"club leader" (officer, board member, etc.) sufficiently motivated to
>"oversee"/push the process forward until the consensus was a consensus
had
>been reached. None of this "fizzling out" nonsense allowed.
>
>I've also some first hand experience with a club which could benefit
>itself,
>the sport of soaring, and probably its safety record if "it effected some
>sort
>of internal cultural change(s?)" but which has been "board resistant" to
>such
>change over decades. Terribly unfortunate. IMO.
>
>Bob W.


A lot is down to personal commitment if you see something that is dangerous

,either stop them doing it or if it you just don't fly.To elaborate ,I once

refused to launch a far better qualified instructor than me because he had
a
child on his wife's knee ,it did not make me popular but he wasn't doing
that
on my watch.I have ,and am sure so have many other,refused
launches,because I thought the child was to young,or they had a drink first
or
there was a storm too close lots of reasons but just say NO if you think
it's
not safe.It won't make you popular but that's not what safety is about.
You asked for it and that's my 2 pence worth
>

Culture change works by means of advocacy. Often times a single
individual can make the difference. It can be an effective way of
dealing with procedural issues and establishing best (or at least
better) practices. Towing, signals, checklists (multiple), oxygen
systems, electrical systems, parachutes, radio procedures, patterns
and suchlike are examples of areas in which best practices and
advocacy of same can be a huge benefit to safe operation. All of
these areas have all been the subject of articles in Soaring Mag,
etc. Plenty of resources. Add will power and advocacy, stir well.

I picked out an issue with my club last year that was so appalling I
can't bear to repeat it here. I mentioned it to a couple of "wheels"
and got zero traction, so I appointed myself the advocate and charged
ahead. People whined: I was asking them to spend money on stuff they
didn't think they needed. Less than $200 a head, I might add. But
mostly they gave in and bought the stuff they needed and those that
did later commented along the lines of "you know, that was smart, it
worked". So this year, I have some help and I expect the advocacy to
become self perpetuating.

I've got my next issue picked out. I'm not going to act on that one
until I am certain that the first is well and truly fixed. Only so
much "political capital" to spend, y'know.

But at best, this is a partial solution. As Kirk points out, we have
a pretty serious safety culture in contest soaring, and it mostly
works at preventing what can be prevented by good procedures. It's
been a long time since we had a take off crash due to improper
rigging. We've fiddled the rules semi-endlessly to try to reduce
hazards associated with starts, finishes and turnpoints and it's
pretty much worked as expected. We still have way too many crashes,
but they seem related to judgement, not to crappy procedure. Can my
supposed good judgement keep me safe? I'm not as certain as I used to
be. I have two dead friends *this month* that seemed to me to have
been serious, safety conscious, conservative pilots, arguably better
examples of safety mindedness than myself. One spins in from pattern
altitude over the airport, the other hits trees on final to what
should have been a routine off field landing in what looks (from
satellite pics and terrain map) to be the friendliest, easiest, most
landable task area in North America. The only semi-unusual factor in
both cases happens to be high wind (25 - 30 kts). These are serious
WTF moments for me. And my family. I'd really like to figure this
out.

-Evan Ludeman / T8

On Wednesday, June 27, 2012 5:47:28 PM UTC-4, Evan Ludeman wrote:
> Culture change works by means of advocacy. Often times a single
> individual can make the difference.

Right on Evan! I'm really glad to see someone (like yourself) who has soaring cred press for resolution of obvious problems. The big wheels can be hooked on "the good enough way that we've always done things". We need more squeaky wheels. More people need to rock the boat. The sport gets safer by fixing one problem at one club at a time. Safety Advocacy. I like that..

On 6/27/2012 3:21 PM, Jonathon May wrote:

<Major snip...>
> A lot is down to personal commitment if you see something that is dangerous
> ,either stop them doing it or if it you just don't fly.To elaborate ,I once
> refused to launch a far better qualified instructor than me because he had
> a child on his wife's knee ,it did not make me popular but he wasn't doing
> that on my watch.I have ,and am sure so have many other,refused
> launches,because I thought the child was to young,or they had a drink first
> or there was a storm too close lots of reasons but just say NO if you think
> it's not safe.It won't make you popular but that's not what safety is about.
> You asked for it and that's my 2 pence worth

Like you, I've refused to help launch people over the years who - for various
reasons - I thought shouldn't be launching...always tried to put things in a
light that didn't offend the other party. Can't remember if bruised egos were
ever a part of the situations, which I suppose suggests they were not, or, I'm
pretty good at burying traumatic events!

The situation you mention is definitely one fraught with human ego. Best to
not be caught by surprise.

If you're less experienced than the the would-be launchee, I'd suggest a
possible approach might be to put "the blame" on your own inexperience. ("I'm
not comfortable launching someone into conditions I'm uncomfortable flying
in.) Humor might be sufficiently deflective.

As noted, forewarned (as to the possibility of encountering such a situation)
is forearmed.

Thanks for chiming in!

Bob W.

On Jun 28, 11:42*am, BobW > wrote:
> On 6/27/2012 3:21 PM, Jonathon May wrote:
>
> <Major snip...>
>
> > A lot is down to personal commitment if you see something that is dangerous
> > ,either stop them doing it or if it you just don't fly.To elaborate ,I once
> > refused to launch a far better qualified instructor than me because he had
> > a child on his wife's knee ,it did not make me popular but he wasn't *doing
> > that on my watch.I have ,and am sure so have many other,refused
> > launches,because I thought the child was to young,or they had a drink first
> > or there was a storm too close lots of reasons but just say NO if you think
> > it's not safe.It won't make you popular *but that's not what safety is about.
> > You asked for it and that's my 2 pence worth
>
> Like you, I've refused to help launch people over the years who - for various
> reasons - I thought shouldn't be launching...always tried to put things in a
> light that didn't offend the other party. Can't remember if bruised egos were
> ever a part of the situations, which I suppose suggests they were not, or, I'm
> pretty good at burying traumatic events!
>
> The situation you mention is definitely one fraught with human ego. Best to
> not be caught by surprise.
>
> If you're less experienced than the the would-be launchee, I'd suggest a
> possible approach might be to put "the blame" on your own inexperience. ("I'm
> not comfortable launching someone into conditions I'm uncomfortable flying
> in.) Humor might be sufficiently deflective.
>
> As noted, forewarned (as to the possibility of encountering such a situation)
> is forearmed.
>
> Thanks for chiming in!
>
> Bob W.

I don't think this would work in a contest environment. I flew my
first contest a few weeks ago and there were a few days that we
launched that if I was free-flying I would not have taken off. Not
that I considered the conditions as "un-safe" but they were not what I
would choose to take off in for purely recreational flying. I was not
alone in my assessment of the conditions either; at the end of the day
there was some talk about the wind and how cross and strong it was.

Perhaps the caliber of pilot flying in contests allows for trickier
margins? I don't know.............but there were no incidents or
accidents and everyone went home with good stories to tell.

Brad

Bert, Excellent article. I'm very concerned about the adrenaline tunnel vision issue and believe it's possibly a bigger factor than we may think. This would explain a lot toward what seems to be a disconnect between highly experienced pilots and accidents rates. I also think it's believable that some experienced pilots may relax their safety margins over time. Fine, untill the day they really need them.

I believe that much discussed Buffalo commuter accident of 2009? showed that the pilot held the yoke full back most of the descent. Could very well be this adrenaline issue.

It won't work in a contest environment very well, but I don't thermal below 1500 AGL, this is the altitude where I concentrate on raising and monitoring my airspeed, staying coordinated and scanning for traffic. I think all this relaxed attitude toward low altitude saves and landouts is not for me. I hear a fair bit of bragging about landouts and how it's no big deal. Read the accident reports for the truth. Not always fatalities, but lot of accidents. ... Aaron

I don't pretend to be an expert, but I wanted to pull out two comments
from this and another thread:

> I also think it's believable that some experienced pilots may relax their safety
> margins over time. *Fine, untill the day they really need them.

and:

> I cannot believe this is pilot error ,comp pilots have so much instinctive skill, that
> is what allows them to deal with every thing else while there body flys the plane.
> So my thoughts are medical ,or possible the main ballast dumped and the fin stayed
> in and pushed the c of g beyond the recoverable range.

In my opinion, these comments, while heartfelt, point out exactly why
I think it's difficult to have any kind of meaningful safety
discussion within the community. First, of course, experienced
pilots relax (or as needed, tighten) their safety margins, that is how
one becomes an experienced pilot. Safety margins necessarily vary
according to the nature of the flight. My margins at 100 hours were
very different from my margins at 1200. My margins taking a passenger
for a ride around the airport are quite different than flying in a
competition. I think it quite simplistic to think that there is one
true set of safety margins that apply to all pilots with all
experience levels under all circumstances, and as a result, it is
impossible to "train" all pilots to a consistent level of "skill" that
will keep them 99.99% safe.

Second, I see a certain element of denial that plays into all safety
discussions. In order to be willing to continue flying (or driving,
etc.), I needed to believe that my skills, experience, and margins
were sufficient to keep me safe from making the kinds of simple errors
other (less safe) pilots made. This created a bit of a conundrum, as
periodically during my soaring career, other pilots that I readily
acknowledged had equal or greater piloting skills than myself still
managed to make fatal errors doing the sorts of things I thought I was
"safe" doing. In fact, of the ten glider pilots I've personally known
who had fatal accidents, all but two were either at my level of skill
or well beyond. There are three ways to handle this conundrum. One
is to simply denigrate the perceived skills and judgement of the pilot
post-accident (which tends to apply here on r.a.s., unless we're
talking about a well known/liked contest pilot). The second is to
find some technological solution to the problem. The third is to
reach the conclusion that NO pilot is immune from making mistakes
(particularly, the seemingly benign choices that lead unexpectedly to
a critical situation), and to adjust the way one thinks while flying
accordingly...

Marc

Psychology of Safety

http://www.flyingmag.com/safety/left-seat-psychology-safety

This is a great article and it really stuck with me when I read it back when it was published.

Does anyone know a link that has a big database of soaring safety articles? ... Aaron

On Jun 30, 10:42*am, akiley > wrote:
> This is a great article and it really stuck with me when I read it back when it was published.
>
> Does anyone know a link that has a big database of soaring safety articles? *... Aaron

I have a small database of soaring safety articles

http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/soaring/index.htm#safety_rules

On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 2:31:06 PM UTC-5, Bill D wrote:
> On Jun 26, 10:54*am, soartech
> wrote:
> > So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without
> > a single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!
> > Head in the sand attitudes will not fix this problem.
> > WE NEED to air the dirty laundry until this problem is much better. We
> > can't depend on speculation on RAS or
> > digging for NTSB reports which often don't contain anything helpful.
> > Give me the facts, ma'am.
>
> Soaring Magazine isn't the place for this subject but the SSF web site
> is. I'd like to see detailed no-holds-barred discussion of every
> accident. Unfortunately, making public allegations of incompetence
> against a deceased pilot CAN get you sued by irate family members.
> There is a need to tread responsibly - and carefully.

Why is Soaring Magazine not the right venue for a detailed discussion of accidents? AOPA Pilot has lots of articles on this topic, and it is one of the more interesting, not to mention informative, parts of the magazine.

On Sunday, July 1, 2012 10:52:37 PM UTC-4, Mike Schumann wrote:

> Why is Soaring Magazine not the right venue for a detailed discussion of accidents?

The majority of the fatalities discussed in Soaring are the fictional characters found in Dr. Dan's Soaring RX column; and the magazine gets grief over that (see this month's letters to the editor). Now imagine what would happen if real accidents were openly discussed.

The obituary section in the magazine (Final Glide) does not even mention if the death happened in a glider... not even an asterisk next to the name.

I wonder if this editorial policy is itself a historical accident, or if the policy evolved over the years. Were accidents ever reported in the magazine? I'd guess that they were and that it caused some discord (this is pure speculation).

On Wednesday, July 4, 2012 6:56:09 PM UTC-4, son_of_flubber wrote:

> The obituary section in the magazine (Final Glide) does not even mention if the death happened in a glider... not even an asterisk next to the name.

I opened the latest Soaring Magazine to find a safety-related letter to the editor by a competition pilot recently killed during a competition, and the mention of another such pilot in the rankings of another competition. That's food for thought.

People (that is, the general public) generally misjudge the risk involved in anything when rare events are involved. It is a well-studied fact that people cannot correctly estimate probabilities of low-frequency events (see Nobel prize winner Kahneman & Tversky's work), and if people are told about these events (as in the media), they become very salient and their probability is over-estimated (see Barron&Erev).

Thus, there are sound reasons why a public magazine does not discuss actual fatalities in a timely manner; however, I agree that this does not serve the soaring community well.

I like the "Never Again" column in AOPA magazine. Perhaps that would be a good compromise.

On 7/4/2012 4:56 PM, son_of_flubber wrote:
> On Sunday, July 1, 2012 10:52:37 PM UTC-4, Mike Schumann wrote:
>
>> Why is Soaring Magazine not the right venue for a detailed discussion of
>> accidents?
>
> The majority of the fatalities discussed in Soaring are the fictional
> characters found in Dr. Dan's Soaring RX column; and the magazine gets
> grief over that (see this month's letters to the editor). Now imagine what
> would happen if real accidents were openly discussed.

Everyone's entitled to opinions, and encouragement of the sharing of them is a
fundamental aspect of "the U.S. system." As is learning how to agree to
disagree...
- - - - - -

>
> The obituary section in the magazine (Final Glide) does not even mention if
> the death happened in a glider... not even an asterisk next to the name.
>
> I wonder if this editorial policy is itself a historical accident, or if
> the policy evolved over the years. Were accidents ever reported in the
> magazine? I'd guess that they were and that it caused some discord (this
> is pure speculation).
>

SSA members have online access to "Soaring" magazine - a treMENdous resource,
btw!!! - and a search using "Safety Corner" will yield decades' worth of
columns (beginning, I seem to remember, in the 1960s) of "useful safety
stuff," very often including description/assessment of real-world-explicit
incidents & accidents.

A search using "George Thelen" will yield author-specific sub-columns mostly
from the '80s and '90s, though George didn't limit himself strictly to
accident reporting.

Great stuff all, IMHO...
- - - - - -

After I'd begun taking soaring instruction in '72, but even before my first
copy of "Soaring" arrived, my club's chief instructor handed me a stapled
package of what turned out to be copies of "Safety Corner"...to tide me over
until my subscription started, he smiled. Then he added he expected me to tell
him what lesson I learned after I'd absorbed the reading material he'd given
me. (Curses! His freebie came with strings attached.)

Put me in the camp that recognizes "Soaring" mag is likely read by some
"'members of the general public," but who also believes its
primary-intended-audience is soaring *enthusiasts*. In any event, even - if
it's still around; I don't know - every issue I ever saw of the v-e-r-y
"general-flying-audience" magazine "Flying" openly discussed real-world
accidents, pretty much in every issue, by multiple authors, some on-staff,
some by readers.

Someone will surely note that "Flying" mag wasn't put out by a member
organization as SSA is. AOPA is a member organization as is EAA. Both of their
monthly "general audience" magazines routinely discuss various aspects of
aviation/piloting safety, sometimes "purely statistically" sometimes using
real-world examples.

I find the arguments: (paraphrasing) "SSA will be at risk/SSA will scare off
potential members," not terribly compelling reasons to NOT discuss in the
magazine real-world-scenario incidents/accidents. JMHO...
- - - - - -

MAJOR Kudos to every individual involved in making happen what Chuck Coyne
writes about in the July "Soaring" mag's "Flight Lines" column. Open
discussion hardly gets any better than what he describes!

Bob W.

On Wednesday, July 4, 2012 3:56:09 PM UTC-7, son_of_flubber wrote:
> On Sunday, July 1, 2012 10:52:37 PM UTC-4, Mike Schumann wrote:
>
> > Why is Soaring Magazine not the right venue for a detailed discussion of accidents?
>
> The majority of the fatalities discussed in Soaring are the fictional characters found in Dr. Dan's Soaring RX column; and the magazine gets grief over that (see this month's letters to the editor). Now imagine what would happen if real accidents were openly discussed.
>
> The obituary section in the magazine (Final Glide) does not even mention if the death happened in a glider... not even an asterisk next to the name.
>
> I wonder if this editorial policy is itself a historical accident, or if the policy evolved over the years. Were accidents ever reported in the magazine? I'd guess that they were and that it caused some discord (this is pure speculation).

At least some of the accidents described in that column are not fictional at all, except the name/place etc. A recent article described an accident which happened in Hobbs a decade ago if I recall correct.

Ramy

+1 On Sunday, July 1, 2012 10:52:37 PM UTC-4, Mike Schumann wrote:
> On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 2:31:06 PM UTC-5, Bill D wrote:
> > On Jun 26, 10:54*am, soartech
> > wrote:
> > > So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without
> > > a single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!
> > > Head in the sand attitudes will not fix this problem.
> > > WE NEED to air the dirty laundry until this problem is much better. We
> > > can't depend on speculation on RAS or
> > > digging for NTSB reports which often don't contain anything helpful.
> > > Give me the facts, ma'am.
> >
> > Soaring Magazine isn't the place for this subject but the SSF web site
> > is. I'd like to see detailed no-holds-barred discussion of every
> > accident. Unfortunately, making public allegations of incompetence
> > against a deceased pilot CAN get you sued by irate family members.
> > There is a need to tread responsibly - and carefully.
>
> Why is Soaring Magazine not the right venue for a detailed discussion of accidents? AOPA Pilot has lots of articles on this topic, and it is one of the more interesting, not to mention informative, parts of the magazine.